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ful and careful guidance and to my parents, Halina and Andrei Laurentsyeu,
for their encouragement and support.
Abstract
The thesis analyses alignment of the Belarusian and Russian economies with
the aim to infer on costs of the possible monetary union for Belarus. Having
estimated a structural vector autoregression model with long-run restrictions,
we conclude that the economies have shared common supply and external de-
mand shocks, but other temporary fluctuations have been, in large, asymmetric.
Structural discrepancies (as proven by the qualitative analysis) and differences
in the monetary policy foci and transmission (as illustrated by the estimation
results of Taylor rules and a monetary vector autoregression model) could ac-
count for increasing misalignment since 2010. In terms of the welfare costs for
Belarus (evaluated with a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium model), the monetary union can be considered preferable to the current
monetary policy of the National bank of the Republic of Belarus, while being
inferior to the hypothetical inflation targeting regime. The welfare gap between
the two arrangements reduces, if stronger domestic price flexibility and higher
synchronization of productivity shocks can be assumed.
JEL Classification F33, F36, F41, E52
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In May 2011, Belarus experienced a severe balance-of-payments crisis, during
which the national currency was devalued by almost 200%, thus, discrediting
the hybrid exchange rate policy conducted by the National Bank of the Repub-
lic of Belarus (NBB) since 2009. In October 2011, the monetary authorities of
Belarus officially declared a switch from the soft-peg to the free-floating regime
with the intention to implement inflation targeting. Yet, as the after-crisis mon-
etary policy has been defined vaguely and has been hampered by high inflation
expectations and low credibility of the NBB, the question on the appropriate
exchange rate arrangement for the Belarusian economy remains open.
The monetary union with Russia could be considered as a viable alternative
to the current monetary policy regime. The factors behind such proposition
include intensive trade relations and high level of factor mobility between the
countries. Adopting relatively more stable Russian ruble could contribute to
the stabilization of inflation in Belarus and bring about other benefits such as
reduction of transaction costs and risk premiums, access to cheaper credit re-
sources, and stimulation of foreign direct investment inflows. At the same time,
apart from direct costs of the new monetary arrangement, introducing the Rus-
sian ruble in Belarus would imply abandonment of the independent monetary
policy and consequent loss of important adjustment mechanisms. The extent
of these costs depends, in large, on the degree of the economies’ alignment and
on the role the Belarusian monetary policy currently plays to absorb shocks.
Another important factor to consider is the feasibility of achieving macroeco-
nomic stability in Belarus by reforming the own monetary policy institution
that presently lacks independence, transparency, and credibility.
The objective of the present thesis is to analyze alignment of the Belarusian
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and Russian economies and, consequently, to infer on some costs of the possible
monetary union for Belarus. We base the analysis on the framework developed
within the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory, i.e. we evaluate some OCA
criteria in terms of their contribution to the costs of fixing the exchange rate
to the Russian ruble. We start by qualitatively assessing convergence of the
Belarusian and Russian economies and proceed with econometric analysis of
shock synchronization, policy rules and their transmission mechanisms. In
order to measure shock symmetry we apply a structural Vector Autoregression
(VAR) model with long-run restrictions that allows us to distinguish between
temporary and permanent shocks. Monetary policy rules and their transmission
mechanisms are compared by estimating Taylor rules and a VAR model with
foreign sector. Finally, we set up a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (NK DSGE) model for a small open economy to measure explicitly
costs of the monetary union relative to alternative arrangements.
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 contains literature review
on the OCA theory and its empirical applications; this chapter also provides
a qualitative analysis of the Belarusian and Russian economies’ convergence.
Chapters 3 and 4 feature the analysis of cyclical alignment. Chapter 3 focuses
on origins of fluctuations and presents estimations of shocks synchronization
and structural symmetry of the economies. Chapter 4 compares responses to
shocks and evaluates alignment of effective monetary policy rules and their
transmission mechanisms. Chapter 5 summarizes the analysis by comparing
welfare losses for the Belarusian economy generated under alternative monetary
policy regimes. Chapter 6 concludes.
Chapter 2
Background Information
The present chapter provides background information on the thesis topic. Sec-
tion 2.1 presents an overview of the monetary policy in Belarus. Section 2.2
features a brief literature review on the OCA theory and relevant empirical stud-
ies. Section 2.3 contains preliminary convergence analysis of the Belarusian and
Russian economies.
2.1 Overview of the Modern Monetary Policy in
the Republic of Belarus. Motivation for the
Monetary Union with the Russian Federation
Following the collapse of the USSR and gradual dissolution of the Ruble Area,
the new Belarusian currency was put into circulation in 1992. After unsuccess-
ful liberalization of the exchange rate in 1994 with consequent depreciation and
hyperinflation, the NBB (the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus) concen-
trated on the stabilization of the currency. Either the Russian Ruble (RUR) or
the US Dollar (USD) were used as anchors; as a rule, the official exchange rate
was periodically revised and set together with a fluctuation band. In 1999, Be-
larus and Russia signed a Treaty on the Creation of the Union State, followed,
in November 2000, by an agreement to introduce common currency. In 2002,
the countries approved a Joint Action Plan for the introduction of a common
monetary unit. Under initial terms of the agreement, the RUR should have
been adopted in Belarus in 2005 and a common currency should have been
introduced in 2008. In the consequent years, the Belarusian monetary author-
ities aimed at fixing the BYR against the RUR and at stabilizing money supply
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growth. However, due to political tensions and disagreements about the ar-
rangements of the monetary union, the integration process slowed down. From
2007 up to the end of 2008, conventional fixed exchange-rate regime (initially,
with both the RUR and the USD and later only with the USD as anchor) was
applied.
As repercussions of the global financial and economic crisis reached Belarus
in late 2008, pegged against the USD the Belarusian ruble could not adjust as
rapidly as the market demanded. In the beginning of 2009, the NBB switched
the USD peg to the currency basket peg (Euro, USD, and RUR) with a 10%
crawling band and devalued the BYR by 20.45% (NBB 2010). The after-crisis
monetary policy was characterized by credit expansion driven by the pressure to
meet targets of high output and wage growth. Monetary emission was largely
used to finance state programs and to accelerate economic recovery. As the
result, in 2010, the real GDP grew by 7.7%. At the same time, following
significant increase of energy prices, the current account deficit reached nearly
15% of the GDP. Expansionary policies also resulted in rapid accumulation of
the external debt that had risen from 25% of the GDP in 2008 to 45% in 2009
and 52.2% in 2010 (NBB Statistics Database).
Loose monetary policy in 2009-2010 combined with the current account
deficit and growing foreign debt contributed to the accumulation of imbalances
in the economy. Expectations of devaluation and inflation resulted in massive
purchases of foreign currencies and withdrawals of FX-denominated deposits
in the end of 2010 - beginning of 2011. Fixed exchange-rate regime created a
threat of FX reserves depletion, and, in March 2011, the NBB imposed restric-
tions on the sale of foreign currency. In May 2011, the NBB finally devalued the
national currency by 56% and allowed for the free-floating of the exchange rate
at the interbank FX market. By October 2011, inflation had reached 74.5%
(CPI growth rate in January-September) and the difference between the offi-
cial and the market exchange rate had constituted around 60%. Money supply
(money aggregate M2 in national currency) grew by 33%, while broad monetary
base (M3) increased by 42% (NBB Statistics Database). In such conditions, the
NBB faced the necessity to make cardinal changes to the monetary policy.
The undertaken measures in the second half of 2011, according to NBB
(2012), included:
 Abandonment of public programs’ financing via expansionary crediting.
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From June 1, 2011, refinancing of the Belarusian banks is allowed only
through short-term conventional money market instruments.
 Ensuring positive real interest rate. This measure resulted in sharp in-
crease of nominal interest rates in the second half of 2011: the refinancing
rate increased from 10.5% (01.01.2011) to 45% (01.01.2012), while aver-
age interbank rates grew from 10.6% to 62.3%.
 Switching to floating exchange rate regime. As the result of abandoning
soft peg in October 2011, the BYR dropped again by 52% from its offi-
cial value. Meanwhile the NBB declared its determination to limit FX
interventions and to rely on monetary policy instruments to guarantee
stability of the exchange rate.
While defining the monetary policy for 2012 and 2013, the NBB formulated
its main goal as lowering of inflation: to 19-22% in 2012 and to 12-15% in
2013. Another declared objective was to ensure sustainable amount of the
international reserves (NBB 2011; 2012). The results of the policy measures
are summarized in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Dynamics of the refinancing rate and monthly growth
rates of the CPI, reserves, and nominal exchange rate in-
dex in 2011-2012, %
Source: NBB Statistics Database
N.B.: Exchange rate index represents units of foreign currency per 1 BYR. Its decrease means
devaluation.
In 2012, annual inflation reached 21.8% and the real refinancing rate through-
out the year was kept positive. Dynamics of the effective nominal exchange
rate remained stable. Yet, some inconsistencies in the monetary policy are still
present and may impede the macroeconomic stabilization in Belarus.
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First, alongside the inflation target, the NBB has to put up with a goal
of high output growth rate set by the government: 8.5% for 2013, which will
be hard to achieve without expansionary policies. Already in the first half of
2012, the NBB started to progressively lower the policy rate, to reach an annual
decrease of 13 percentage points (from 43% to 30%). During the first six
months of 2013, the refinancing rate was decreased by another 6.5 percentage
points. Another worrying signal is the recent increase of the real wages that
has outpaced productivity growth. In 2012, the latter indicator made up 3.4%,
while the growth rate of the real wages constituted 21.9% (NBB 2013).
Second, the positive effect of currency devaluation on net exports has al-
ready vanished, and the balance of payments has again experienced deteriora-
tion since Autumn 2012. The need to pay out debt, difficulties in attracting
foreign capital, and the intention of the NBB to support the value of the BYR
create additional pressure on the reserves amount and, consequently, on the ex-
change rate. Moreover, as an important argument against the current floating
exchange rate regime, we should mention limitations of the Belarusian financial
market and insufficient volumes of the FX operations with the BYR for proper
hedging activities.
Inflation and depreciation expectations are still high: average annual inter-
bank interest rates constituted 27.6% in December 2012 and increased to 35.3%
in January 2013. The share of FX-denominated deposits, in the beginning of
2013, made up around 55% of the broad money supply (M3 aggregate); prior
to the currency crisis in 2011, this indicator had fluctuated between 35-45%.
Households’ savings in the foreign currency represent more than 70% of all
deposits (NBB Statistics Database).
In this context, discussions on the possible monetary union with Russia
have rearisen. Some real effects of this arrangement look appealing: reduc-
tion of transaction costs should benefit Belarusian business, while potential
decrease of uncertainty and improved access to foreign capital could facilitate
the conduct of structural reforms and renovation of enterprises. Positive mon-
etary effect may result from importing presumably tighter policy of the CBR.
Close trade links between the countries and long history of economic integra-
tion that has intensified with the establishment of the Common Economic Area
(January 2012) shall contribute to the success of such arrangement. From an-
other side, abandonment of the independent monetary policy will bring about
loss of shock-absorbing instruments (interest and exchange rate). Other losses
may arise due to larger vulnerability to external shocks, some increase of the
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price level, and possible political and social tensions. The extent of these costs
depends on many criteria. However, the objective of the present thesis is to
evaluate the costs that may arise due to misalignment of the Belarusian and
Russian economies. Consequent sections address the following hypotheses:
1. Despite long-dated history of integration, there is significant cyclical and
structural misalignment between the Belarusian and Russian economies due to
asymmetry of shocks and different specializations.
2. There are substantial differences between current monetary policy responses
to shocks in Belarus and Russia and their transmission mechanisms.
3. Welfare losses for the Belarusian economy associated with the possible mon-
etary union will be higher than those implied by the inflation targeting regime
and the effective monetary policy rule.
In case of significant misalignment in terms of sources and responses to shocks,
Belarus is likely to bear high costs of the monetary union, since the single pol-
icy would not be efficient in addressing country-specific fluctuations or would
result in undesired feedback.
2.2 Optimum Currency Areas: Theory and Em-
pirics
To verify the aforestated hypotheses, we apply empirical frameworks based
on the Optimum Currency Area (OCA ) theory. The OCA approach helps
to evaluate possible benefits and costs of monetary integration and, hence,
to determine whether countries of interest constitute an optimum one-currency
region. Comprehensive literature surveys on the OCA are presented in Mongelli
(2002), Dellas & Tavlas (2009), and Grauwe (2012).
Mundell (1961) laid the basis of the theory by formulating and providing an
intuitive answer to a question ”what is optimum currency area?” The proposed
definition of an OCA is simply ’a domain within which the exchange rate is
fixed’; optimality of such domain, according to Mundell, depends on internal
factor mobility that could facilitate adjustment to shocks. McKinnon (1963)
and Kenen (1969), followed by other researches, made further contributions by
identifying possible benefits and costs of monetary integration and elaborating
on the optimality criteria of the OCA. As a summary of the OCA theoretical
literature, Table 2.1 presents possible costs and benefits of monetary integration
for a country that gives up its own monetary policy by either adopting some
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common legal tender or anchoring to another country’s currency. Here and
further in the text, the term ”monetary integration” is employed in broad
sense and encompasses various types of the hard peg.
Table 2.1: Benefits and costs of the monetary integration
Benefits
 Elimination of transaction costs;
 Reduction of exchange rate vari-
ability and corresponding risks;
 Reduction of barriers to financial
integration and better access to
international financial markets;
 Creation of more favorable in-
vestment environment;
 Prevention of the inflationary
bias of the monetary authorities;
lowering of inflation rates.
Costs
 Direct costs of losing seignorage
income and of legal procedures
needed to frame the new mone-
tary arrangement;
 Loss of independent monetary
policy, and thus, of specific tools
(exchange rate and interest rate)
used to facilitate the economy’s
adjustment to shocks;
 Larger effects of real domestic
shocks (higher variability of out-
put and consumption);
 Larger vulnerability to exter-
nal real, monetary, and financial
shocks;
 Likely increase of the public
debt in case of the current ac-
count imbalances and low com-
petitiveness of an entering coun-
try (Greek problem).
Source: based on Grauwe (2012), Volz (2010), Mongelli (2002)
Given the benefits and costs of monetary integration, the next step in the
OCA analysis is to identify a number of criteria a country has to meet in or-
der to minimize costs of abandoning its own monetary policy and, from an-
other side, in order to profit to a larger extent from the common-currency
benefits. Mongelli (2002) defines the OCA criteria as properties that reduce
the efficiency of nominal exchange rate adjustments relative to what could be
achieved by a single monetary policy and alternative stabilization mechanisms.
An important contribution of the early OCA studies was to identify such core
properties. Mundell (1961) named factor mobility and incidence of common
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shocks as critical determinants for the design of one-currency areas. McKinnon
(1963) emphasized the importance of an economy’s openness to its potential
common-currency partners; while Kenen (1969) discussed advantages of fis-
cal integration and argued that diversification of production and consumption
within probable members of a currency union should reduce likelihood of asym-
metric shocks. Mundell (1973) pointed that financial market integration and
international risk sharing could compensate for idiosyncratic shocks within a
currency union. Other commonly cited OCA criteria include: flexibility of wages
and prices, similarity of economies’ structures, convergence of price levels, in-
flation, and interest rates, credibility of the common monetary authority. With
the development of the OCA theory, the so called meta-criteria were formulated,
such as synchronization of shocks and alignment of policy responses.
A theoretical framework for evaluation of real and monetary effects of cur-
rency unions is provided, for instance, in Alesina & Barro (2002). According
to the proposed model, a positive real effect of a currency union is related to
reduction of trading costs and better distribution of resources between involved
countries, while monetary effects may be both positive and negative. Costs arise
from the loss of independent monetary policy that generates country-specific
responses to shocks. Meanwhile, a country with uncommitted monetary au-
thorities may benefit from anchoring to a state that features credible policy
rules. The authors showed that optimality of a currency union depends on size
of countries, trade links between them, and shock synchronization. Alesina and
Barro concluded that a typical country to have the strongest incentive to join
a currency union is a small open economy with a history of high inflation that
is close (in a variaty of ways) to a large and monetary-stable potential anchor.
The stream of empirical literature on the OCA has developed primarily
alongside the economic and monetary integration processes in Europe. Later,
the methods elaborated within the OCA theory were applied to study integra-
tion prospects in other regions: the Latin American and Asian countries (Lar-
rain & Tavares 2003; Volz 2010), Africa (Houssa 2008). Many early studies
provided general cost and benefit analysis of the possible monetary integration
using simple criteria (such as trade openness, similarity of economies’ struc-
tures) and basic alignment indicators. Later empirical works focused on deeper
analysis of specific OCA properties: price and wage flexibility (Blanchard &
Wolfers 1999), labor and financial market integration (Decressin & Fatas 1995;
Crucini & Hess 1999), price level and inflation rate convergence (Cihak & Holub
2005), fiscal integration (Mongelli & Bandt 2000), etc. The studies of meta-
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criteria such as shock similarity developed in 1990s. Bayoumi & Eichengreen
(1996) extended a SVAR approach developed by Blanchard & Quah (1989) to
analyze incidence of demand and supply shocks across the European economies.
Despite many limitations, estimating synchronization of shocks has become a
common part of the OCA analysis, as it is believed to summarize economic
and financial alignment of the countries. Similarity of the policy responses to
shocks and their transmission provides a complementing insight on the conver-
gence of economies. VAR models have been conventionally used to investigate
alignment of monetary policies within a (perspective) one-currency area. Rel-
evant empirical studies are reviewed in more detail in Subsection 4.1.2. One
of the recent developments in the OCA empirical studies has been application
of the New-Keynesian models. This framework accounts for micro foundations
and sets explicit welfare criteria for the monetary policy regimes. To some
extent, it also overcomes the Lucas critique. As a recent example, Ajevskis &
Vitola (2011) estimated a small open economy NK DSGE model for seven EU
countries, non-members of the euro area, in order to compare implications of
the inflation-targeting versus fixed exchange-rate regime.
Costs and benefits of possible monetary integration between Belarus and
Russia had received some attention following the signing of the Treaty on the
Creation of the Union State (1999) and adoption of the Joint Action Plan for
the introduction of a common monetary unit (2002). Prokopenko et al. (2004)
qualitatively investigated whether Belarus and Russia fulfill some OCA crite-
ria (in particular, convergence of structural indicators, correlation of output
gaps, and availability of other adjustment mechanisms) and discussed imple-
mentation issues of the possible monetary union. In addition to commonly
accepted criteria, the authors compared levels of economic restructuring and
liberalization. The study concluded that the adequate base for an operating
currency union was yet to be established and that the long-term effects of mon-
etary integration for Belarus were not clear. Kallaur (2001) and Tereshenko
(2002b;a) provided quantitative analysis of whether Belarus and Russia met
various OCA criteria and elaborated on the possible implications of the mone-
tary union. Using the framework outlined in Bayoumi & Eichengreen (1998),
Tereshenko (2002a) analyzed exchange market pressure and reported absense
of significant shock correlation between the Belarusian and Russian economies.
Cernookij (2005) applied the Blanchard and Quah (1989) procedure on the
quarterly data (1996-2003) and found that both demand and supply shocks
in Belarus and Russia were asymmetric. Overall conclusion from the studies
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conducted in 2002-2006 was that Belarus and Russia did not constitute an
OCA. Following the establishment of the Common Economic Area between
Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, Luzgina (2012) qualitatively examined con-
vergence of some economic variables in Russia and Belarus in 2000-2010. The
paper (although lacking rigorous justifications) concluded on undesirability of
the monetary union between the countries.
The present thesis provides several quantitative measures of alignment be-
tween Belarus and Russia. The analyzed time-series encompass quarterly and
monthly data from 2000 to 2012, thus, including the periods of the financial
crisis in 2008-2009 and the balance-of-payments crisis in Belarus in 2011. In
this way, the work contributes to the empirical applications of the OCA theory
and to the studies of the Belarusian and Russian integration.
2.3 Convergence of the Russian and the Belaru-
sian Economies: Qualitative Analysis
The section presents a qualitative analysis of some real and nominal variables,
thus, giving a preliminary insight on the alignment between the Belarusian and
Russian economies and fulfillment of some OCA criteria. Table 2.2 highlights
basic data on Russia and Belarus.
Table 2.2: Russia and Belarus: Basic data, 2012
Indicator Belarus Russia Belarus as
% of Russia
Population, mln 9.7 141.9 6.8%
Size, thousand sq km 207.6 17075 1.2%
GDP, mlrd USD 63.1 2053 3.1%
(current prices)
GDP per cap., USD PPP 13427 15177 88%
(constant prices, 2005)
Bilateral Trade Turnover 45.2% 4.4% —
(% of total trade)
Source: The World Bank DataBank, bilateral Balance of Payments (NBB Statistics
Database).
The data suggests asymmetry of the possible monetary union. With Russia
being the dominant partner, Belarus has low opportunities to influence the
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common monetary policy in case of individual shocks. Therefore, the degree
of alignment between the economies (dependent on the presence of the OCA
criteria) will determine whether single monetary policy, conducted mostly in
the interests of Russia, can be also acceptable for Belarus.
Openness of an economy is one of the critical factors in the cost and benefit
analysis of a possible monetary union with country’s trading partner(s). As a
rule, the more open a country is, the more likely it is that the benefits will out-
weigh the costs. Trade turnover with Russia (as of 2012, Balance of Payments,
NBB Statistics Database) made up 72% of the Belarusian GDP or 45.2% of the
total trade. Exports to Russia constituted 34% of the total Belarusian exports,
while imports featured a 57.1% share. From one side, these figures promise
big potential for reduction of transaction costs in case of the monetary union;
also one may expect high degree of shock synchronization. From another side,
trade imbalance takes place: the trade deficit with Russia as of 2012 consti-
tuted 16.3% of the Belarusian GDP. Besides, structural misalignment in trade
is present: mineral products compose more than 60% of the Belarusian imports
from Russia, while agriculture and food items, vehicles, and equipment prevail
among exports to Russia.
Figure 2.2 illustrates annual dynamics of the key macroeconomic indicators:
real GDP growth rates, unemployment rates, CPI inflation, exchange rate to
USD change, and average lending interest rates.
The annual growth rates of the real GDP have had similar patterns, with
the Belarusian economy growing, in general, at a slightly higher speed. The
unemployment figures are not very representative as the Belarusian statistical
office reports only the share of registered unemployed people; this indicator may
underestimate by 3-4 times the unemployment rate defined in compliance with
the International Labor Organization (ILO) methodology. Despite this bias,
comparison of the variables shows that the economic policies of the Belarusian
authorities are focused on preserving low unemployment. For instance, the
number of registered unemployed people increased imperceptibly during 2008-
2009 crisis in Belarus.
As to the nominal variables, there had been high convergence of inflation
rates in 2004-2010 as the NBB implemented soft-peg regime with relatively slim
fluctuation band. The movements of the nominal official exchange rates (rela-
tive to the USD) had been visually symmetric, including devaluation in 2009 of
both the RUR and the BYR. Consequently, the average lending interest rates
had converged; despite higher inflation, in 2009-2010 lending rates in Belarus
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Figure 2.2: Dynamics of the key macroeconomic indicators in Belarus
and Russia, %
Source: The World Bank DataBank.
N.B. Here, nominal exchange rate is an official average exchange rate (Local currency per 1
USD) for a given year.
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were lower than in Russia, what can indicate discount financing. However, since
2008, Belarus had featured higher money supply growth rate, which (given the
attempt to stabilize inflation using the soft-peg regime under current account
deficit) had contributed to the creation of imbalances in the economy.
Figure 2.3 illustrates development of real GDP per capita (at Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP)) and relative price levels in Belarus and Russia.
Figure 2.3: Real convergence of the Belarusian and Russian economies
Source: The World Bank DataBank, own calculations.
Both Russia and Belarus belong to the group of upper middle income coun-
tries with about the same level of the GDP per capita. There has been slightly
higher convergence in terms of this indicator since 2009, as Russia had ap-
parently experienced sharper economic decline. The relative price level was
calculated using the PPP conversion factor (GDP based) to market exchange
rate ratio. The price level in Belarus had constituted around 80-88% of the
Russian indicator with some signs of convergence before the crisis in 2008-
2009. The price level differential has started to increase since 2010 (due to loss
of the BYR purchasing power relative to the USD), and in 2012 was almost at
the level of 1997.
As to the average monthly wages (expressed in USD), after slight recovery
in 2012, the Belarusian wages still make up only about 52% of the Russian
nominal average earnings or about 71% at the PPP. Hence, before entering
the monetary union with Russia, Belarus should undergo real convergence in
terms of price levels and wages. Otherwise, in the absence of exchange-rate
adjustment channel, real convergence may result in higher inflation and real
interest rates differentials, thus, impeding the efficiency of the single monetary
policy.
Figure 2.4 depicts fiscal and foreign positions of Belarus and Russia.
2. Background Information 15
Figure 2.4: Fiscal and foreign positions of Belarus and Russia
Source: EBRD Economic Data.
Regarding the fiscal position, the budgets have been, in general, balanced
in both countries with fiscal deficits present only in 2009 and 2010 (reached
maximums: -5.9% in Russia in 2009 and -2.6% in Belarus in 2010). However,
from 2008, misalignment of the public debt indicators has increased. Debt of
the Belarusian central government (both domestic and foreign) grew in 2008-
2009 to almost 20% of the GDP with the issuance of the government Eurobonds.
As to the foreign position, the current account surplus is characteristic for
the Russian economy, while the contrary holds for Belarus. Following devalua-
tion of the BYR in 2011, the current account position improved to some extent
in 2012 (the deficit reduced to 3% of the GDP); however, the current account
deficit with Russia in 2012 remained above 20%.
Some financial and banking sector indicators are presented in Figure 2.5.
Since 2004-2005 the banking sectors in Russia and Belarus have become more
aligned in terms of their weight in the economy (assets to GDP ratio, domestic
credit to GDP ratio), concentration and overall performance. In both Belarus
and Russia, state-owned banks have the largest market shares (50% of total
assets in Russia and 66% in Belarus), while five largest banks control more
than 50% of the market. The Belarusian banking sector has to rely more on
external sources of financing (as the amount of loans surpasses that of deposits;
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Figure 2.5: Financial and banking sector indicators of Belarus and
Russia
Source: The World Bank DataBank.
however, due to stricter credit policy in 2011-2012, the loan-to-deposit ratio has
had a tendency to decrease). Foreign banks account for 32.6% of total assets in
Belarus. The market share of the Russian banks is estimated at 25% of total
assets (NBB 2013). Thus, some transmission of the CBR monetary policy has
already taken place through the credit channel.
The EBRD transition indicators provide an additional insight on the align-
ment of the economies (Table 2.3).
The pace of transition reforms in Belarus has been slower than in Rus-
sia, although some progress has been recently done concerning improvement
of the business environment (taxation, registration, and licensing of business).
Yet, higher share of state-owned enterprises, insufficiently liberalized prices and
labor market, and regulated financial sector are likely to complicate transmis-
sion of the single monetary policy and to limit shock-absorption capabilities of
other mechanisms (such as prices, wages, and capital mobility). From another
side, further integration with Russia could contribute to faster institutional and
structural changes in Belarus.
The results of the qualitative analysis provide ambiguous conclusions on
alignment of the economies. Several observations suggest that high costs of
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Table 2.3: EBRD Transformation indicators, 2012
Indicator* Belarus Russia
Large scale privatisation 1.7 3.0
Small scale privatisation 2.3 4.0
Enterprise restructuring 1.7 2.3
Price liberalisation 3.0 4.0
Trade and FX system 2.3 4.0
Competition policy 2.0 2.7
Financial sector transformation 2 2.7
Source: EBRD Economic Data.
*1 represents little or no change from a rigid centrally planned economy and 4+ represents
the standards of an industrialized market economy.
the monetary union are unlikely for Belarus, among them: openness of Belarus
relative to Russia, general convergence in terms of output growth rates, similar
income levels, balanced budget, and ownership links in the banking sector.
From another side, trade imbalances and current account deficit with Russia are
present, as well as discrepancies in price levels and wages. Belarus is gradually
converging to the Russian economy, which may be accomplished more efficiently
under flexible exchange-rate regime. Different paces of market reforms and
remaining rigidities in both economies may increase costs of fixing the exchange
rate to the RUR.
Chapter 3
Shock Synchronization and
Structural Alignment of the
Economies
Synchronization of business cycles within a common currency area is usually
referred to as one of the most important OCA criteria. Once fluctuations of
the member-economies are symmetric, the single monetary policy may be suf-
ficient to facilitate stabilization in each particular country. Hence, the relative
costs associated with the loss of independent monetary policy are reduced.
This chapter analyses symmetry of the business cycles in Russia and Belarus
by focusing on the sources of the fluctuations. Section 3.1 features prelimi-
nary analysis based on simple correlation measures between some indicators of
economic activity. Section 3.2 presents estimated correlations of demand and
supply shocks recovered from a structural VAR model. Section 3.3 analyses
indicators of the structural alignment of Russia and Belarus.
3.1 Cyclical Correlations
First, we perform correlation analysis of several economic activity indicators to
obtain a general view on the cyclical alignment of the Belarusian and Russian
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where covxy stands for covariance between series x and y; σx and σy represent
standard deviations of the series. To follow dynamics, we use rolling correlation
coefficients. The moving time window for a given observation (quarter) is
defined as 11 preceding quarters plus the observation itself.
The coefficients are calculated for the growth rates of real GDP and export
volumes. The series are taken on quarterly basis and cover the period from
2000:Q1 to 2012:Q4 (52 observations). The data is obtained from the National
statistical offices and the central banks of Belarus and Russia. Prior to the
analysis, the time-series were log-transformed to account for the exponential
growth. Growth rates were calculated using two approaches: 1)year-on-year
(seasonal) differences were applied to the original series; 2) quarter-on-quarter
differences were taken for the seasonally adjusted series. Seasonal adjustment
was conducted using X-12-Arima package, available in Gretl. Figure 3.1 repre-
sents the alignment of the economic activity indicators.
Figure 3.1: Dynamics of the economic activity indicators, original se-
ries, y-o-y changes, %
Source: National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus, Federal State Statistics
Service of the Russian Federation.
Table 3.1 contains correlation coefficients of economic activity indicators
for the whole analyzed period (with lower and upper boundaries at 95% con-
fidence level). It also shows probability of accepting the null hypothesis of no
correlation between the series.
Correlation indicators suggest high degree of the economic activity align-
ment in Belarus and Russia. In particular, export growth rates are strongly
synchronized. Vertical integration of the economies (from the Soviet times)
may be behind the obtained numbers.
Figure 3.2 depicts evolution of rolling correlation coefficients calculated over
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Table 3.1: Correlation coefficients of the economic activity indicators
Indicator Coefficient pValue Lower B. Upper B.
GDP (y-o-y) [0.6068] [0] [ 0.3899] [ 0.7599]
Exports (y-o-y) [0.9285] [0] [ 0.8497] [ 0.9667]
GDP (q-o-q) [0.3469] [ 0.0126] [ 0.0789] [ 0.5682]
Exports (q-o-q) [0.8610] [0] [ 0.7292] [ 0.9313]
Source: own calculations.
3-year windows. The strongest symmetry is observed in the years 2005-2009
Figure 3.2: Rolling correlations of the economic activity indicators,
original series, y-o-y changes, %
Source: own calculations.
3-year (12 quarters) rolling windows.
that featured relatively favorable economic conditions for both countries. In-
creasing synchronization of the economies’ growth rates in that period also
reflects convergence achieved following the establishment of the Union State.
Since 2008, though, the integration process had slowed down. Moreover, dif-
ferent after-crisis recovery paths contributed to the increasing misalignment
of the economies. Stabilization policies in Belarus in 2009-2010 focused pri-
marily on mitigating short-term effects of the crisis and resulted in the new
downturn in 2011. It may also be true that convergence in 2005-2008 was
not based on fundamentals, rather due to the general economic upturn. Ta-
ble 3.2 contains correlation coefficients calculated for two separate sub-samples:
2000:Q1-2009:Q4 and 2010:Q1-2012:Q4. The choice of the threshold is based
on the observation of the rolling correlations (2010:Q1 features decrease of cor-
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relation coefficients for both indicators of economic activity). In addition, three
preceding quarters had been marked by a number of anti-crisis actions by the
Belarusian authorities, such as devaluation of the BYR, change in the currency
peg, and attraction of foreign loans.
Table 3.2: Correlation coefficients of the economic activity indicators:
sub-samples
2001:Q1 - 2009:Q4
Indicator Coefficient pValue Lower B. Upper B.
GDP (y-o-y) [0.7072] [0] [ 0.4971] [ 0.8390]
Exports (y-o-y) [0.9778] [0] [ 0.9379] [ 0.9921]
GDP (q-o-q) [0.4100] [0.0086] [ 0.1129] [ 0.6398]
Exports (q-o-q) [0.9170] [0] [ 0.7985] [ 0.9671]
2010:Q1 - 2012:Q4
Indicator Coefficient pValue Lower B. Upper B.
GDP (y-o-y) [-0.1066] [0.7416] [-0.6413] [ 0.4978]
Exports (y-o-y) [ 0.6226] [0.0306] [ 0.0757] [ 0.8815]
GDP (q-o-q) [-0.2085] [0.5156] [-0.6988] [ 0.4151]
Exports (q-o-q) [ 0.5932] [0.0420] [ 0.0293] [ 0.8707]
Source: own calculations.
We use output gap as additional proxy of economic activity. Output gap is
obtained by extracting the cyclical component of the seasonally-adjusted GDP
time-series with Hodrick-Prescott (further, HP) filter (λ = 1600 for quarterly
observations). Table 3.3 shows correlation coefficients, calculated for the whole
period and 2 subsamples.
Table 3.3: Correlation coefficients of the output gaps
Indicator Coefficient pValue Lower B. Upper B.
2001:Q1-2012:Q4 [ 0.6064] [0] [ 0.3997] [ 0.7545]
2001:Q2-2009:Q4 [ 0.7260] [0] [ 0.5386] [ 0.8449]
2010:Q1-2012:Q4 [ -0.3352] [0.2869] [ -0.7624] [ 0.2956]
Source: own calculations.
The conclusions are in line with the previous analysis: correlation coeffi-
cients of the output gaps are close to those obtained for the year-on-year GDP
growth rates. In general, we witness some alignment in the economies’ business
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cycles, mostly, because the countries are subject to common external shocks;
different responses to fluctuations might be the major sources of growing mis-
alignment since 2010.
When using the EU countries as benchmarks (CNB 2012), the correlation
between economic activity indicators in Belarus and Russia is comparable, for
example, to the alignment of Poland and Slovakia with the EU as a whole.
Yet, if most EU countries featured increase in correlation coefficients as the
result of the 2008-2009 crisis, in the Russian-Belarusian case, the crisis led to
the opposite effect.
3.2 Synchronization of Shocks
3.2.1 Methodology
Since macroeconomic variables hardly respond in the same way to all types of
shocks, it might be of use to distinguish between various types and origins of
disturbances. It is common to differentiate between shocks that temporarily
affect the economy (demand shocks) and those that have long-term impact
(supply shocks, which can be also interpreted as productivity gains/losses).
Blanchard & Quah (1989) proposed a feasible procedure to decompose the
observed shocks into supply and demand disturbances. This approach has been
followed by other researches in their empirical studies on the OCA (Babetskii
2005; Volz 2010, see, for example,). Within the OCA analysis, the treatment of
demand and supply shocks is not uniform regarding their contribution to the
costs of monetary integration. Some argue (Grauwe 2012) that, since demand
shocks often result from country-specific monetary policies, their significance
will automatically decrease with the introduction of a common currency, and,
hence, asymmetry of demand shocks is not critical for evaluation of the possible
costs. Other researchers argue that symmetry of demand disturbances is, on
the contrary, important; the economies sharing, for instance, external demand
shocks, are likely to be cyclically aligned. Babetskii et al. (2004) mention that
misalignment in terms of supply shocks is not necessarily problematic, since
it may be ”simply” translated into inflation differentials. We will refrain from
discussing relative importance of demand and supply shocks’ symmetry for the
costs of the monetary union and, within the scope of this work, will rather
concentrate on estimation of their general alignment.
3. Shock Synchronization and Structural Alignment of the Economies 23
Blanchard & Quah (1989) proposed a procedure to decompose observed
shocks to output and unemployment into two types of underlying disturbances:
supply and demand. For the needs of the OCA analysis, correlation coefficients
are then computed separately for the recovered supply and demand shocks.
It has been a common practice to use GDP as output indicator and price in-
dex (either GDP deflator or CPI) as additional macroeconomic variable. The
algorithm of applying Blanchard and Quah decomposition is presented below.
1. Two types of disturbances (supply and demand) are assumed to affect
output and price level. Supply shocks have long-term effect on output level,
while demand shocks’ impact is short-term. It is also assumed that both shocks
have permanent effect on price level (or temporary effect on inflation - with co-
movement during demand shocks and opposite reaction of output and inflation
to supply shocks).
Table 3.4: Reaction of output and prices to the aggregate shocks
Indicator Shock SR LR
Output positive AS positive positive
positive AD positive zero
Price level positive AS negative negative
positive AD positive positive
Source: Blanchard & Quah (1989)
2. Joint process of output growth rates and inflation is constructed using
Wold decomposition. Both output growth rate and inflation are represented as






X(t) = [M y(t) π(t)]′; M y(t) - output growth rate; π(t) - inflation rate;
e(t) = [ed(t) es(t)]
′; ed(t) - demand shock; es(t) - supply shock;
variance of structural disturbances is constant and normalized to 1 for con-
venience; it is assumed that demand and supply shocks are not correlated:
covar(ed, es) = 0;
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A(t) - matrix of response coefficients to structural shocks at lag t :
A(t) =
∣∣∣∣∣ a11(t) a12(t)a21(t) a22(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
3. Usual VAR (in reduced-form) is estimated. It can be also represented as







′; uy(t) - observed shock to output; uπ(t) - observed shock to
inflation; var(u) = Ω.
B(t) - matrix of estimated response coefficients to observed shocks at lag t :
B(t) =
∣∣∣∣∣ b11(t) b12(t)b21(t) b22(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
The innovations (observed shocks) are linear combinations of underlying supply
and demand disturbances (3.3).∣∣∣∣∣ uy(t)uπ(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ =




4. In order to recover underlying supply and demand shocks, four restric-
tions should be imposed. The first three restrictions follow from the relation
between innovations in the reduced-form VAR and underlying demand and







covar(uy, uπ) = a11(0)a21(0) + a12(0)a22(0);
The fourth restriction follows from the definition of the demand shock that
is assumed to have only temporary impact on the output, i.e. its cumulative
effect on output growth rates should sum up to zero:
∞∑
j=0
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5. Having obtained the coefficients, one can recover structural supply and
demand shocks and measure their correlation.
In order to apply Blanchard and Quah procedure both series should be
stationary. Blanchard and Quah solve the problem by removing the time-
trend from the unemployment series and by allowing for a structural break
in the output growth rates. Alternative approach is to check the series for
cointegration and if the latter is present, to estimate a Vector Error Correction
Model (VECM). However, in the case of a two-variable model, this approach
features a caveat (overidentification), in a way that if one variable has a long-
run zero restriction, the other (due to cointegration) has to possess it as well.
3.2.2 Data
For the purpose of analysis, following datasets were used for both countries:
real GDP (as proxy of output) and the CPI (as primary inflation measure).
As an alternative inflation measure, we use the Producer Price Index (PPI).
The data was taken on a quarterly basis, spanning from 2000Q1 to 2012Q4.
The time-series were log-transformed and growth rates were calculated using
year-on-year (seasonal) differences.
The variables were checked for stationarity using Augmented Dickey-Fuller
Test. Output growth rates and inflation indicators were reported to be sta-
tionary for Russia at 10% confidence level and non-stationary for Belarus. We
adopt the Blanchard and Quah approach and, prior to VAR estimation, perform
some transformations of the series. Both Russia and Belarus, as countries in
transition, have been subject to structural breaks and gradual macroeconomic
stabilization, which, if not accounted for, could distort the results.
The series were stationarized in the following way. Output growth rates
(both countries) were demeaned for Russia and detrended for Belarus; a struc-
tural break was allowed in 2008(Q4) for both countries. The threshold was
selected based on the best fit of the deterministic part. Inflation series (both
CPI and PPI) were transformed by removing the time-trend and, additionally
for Belarus, by setting a structural break in 2011(Q2), when the BYR was
devalued.
3.2.3 Results
The best-fit model (based on the information criteria and residuals’ character-
istics) was a two-lag VAR with the CPI as inflation measure. Further in the
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section, we refer to the results obtained for this specification. Figure 3.3 repre-
sents the plots of extracted demand and supply shocks, while Table 3.5 shows
the calculated correlations.
Figure 3.3: Extracted demand and supply shocks, units
Source: own calculations.
Table 3.5: Correlation coefficients of the demand and supply shocks
Indicator Coefficient pValue Lower B. Upper B.
2001:Q1 - 2012:Q4
Demand [-0.1101] [0.4665] [-0.3880] [ 0.1862]
Supply [ 0.2290] [0.1258] [-0.0656] [ 0.4870]
2001:Q1 - 2009:Q4
Demand [0.0646] [0.7124] [-0.2746] [ 0.3895]
Supply [0.5096] [0.0018] [ 0.2124] [ 0.7205]
2010:Q1 - 2012:Q4
Demand [-0.2734] [0.3898] [-0.7324] [ 0.3564]
Supply [-0.3198] [0.3108] [-0.7551] [ 0.3112]
Source: own calculations.
By visual inspection of the Figure 3.3, we note that the shocks, extracted as
demand, are unsynchronized, except for the period 2008-2009. The discrepancy
increases since 2010 (Q2). If we qualify the after-crisis demand shocks as mostly
policy-induced, we may support our previous proposition that Belarus and
Russia featured different responses to the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Positive
demand shock in 2010(Q2) may also reflect the expansionary monetary policy of
the NBB aimed at stimulating internal demand. Supply shocks, on the contrary,
seem to be relatively aligned, from 2005 up to the currency crisis in 2011.
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The calculated coefficients complement the above conclusions. Positive sig-
nificant correlations are found only for supply shocks in the first subsample
(2000-2009), thus, suggesting higher symmetry between the long-term (real)
fluctuations. The results might be surprising given high correlation of the
economic activity indicators reported earlier in the chapter. Obtained lower
cyclical alignment can be attributed to the detrending procedures. The corre-
lation of the transformed GDP growth rates falls to 0.27 for the whole sample
and to 0.39 for the 2001-2009 selection, what is more consistent with the figures
obtained for the supply and demand shocks.
While analyzing the results, we should be aware of the possible caveats.
First, stationarization of the series may have resulted in the loss of important
information. Second, the shocks were supposed to be identified based on the
persistence of their effects (temporary vs. long-term); however, given short
length of the available samples, some demand shocks, may have been identified
as supply disturbances due to their relatively large and prolonged effect on the
economic activity. Third, limitations of the specified VAR do not allow differen-
tiating between the sources of disturbances: i.e. foreign vs. domestic shocks or,
especially, exogenous shocks vs. policy-induced impacts. A common negative
demand shock in 2009 reflects the consequences of the external demand drop
due to the financial crisis, while the later shocks are likely to be related to the
policy impacts. In general, the results are consistent with those obtained in the
previous section: alignment between the Russian and Belarusian economies was
significant during 2005-2009, but has shrunk since 2010. Some complementary
conclusions can be drawn. When accounted for the time trend in the output
growth rates, the correlation of economic activity drops roughly from 60% to
30%. Long-term fluctuations (i.e. productivity changes or simply high-impact
shocks) are more synchronized than the temporary disturbances, in particular,
those related to the policy impacts.
3.3 Structural Alignment
We analyze structural alignment of the economies by estimating Landesmann
structural index, Grubel-Lloyd intra-industry trade index, and evaluating own-
ership links between Belarus and Russia.
Landesmann structural index
Incidence of asymmetric shocks also depends on structural differences be-
tween the economies. Sensitivity of firms to the monetary policy decisions dif-
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fers across industries; consequently, structural (dis)similarity may have direct
implications for the determination of the optimum currency area. Landesmann
structural index characterizes contribution of different sectors to the total value
added. When used to compare economy structures of two countries (A and B),





(shiA − shiB)2 ∗ shiA/100 (3.4)
where shi stands for percentage share of the i-th sector in the value added
of a country. The index can take values between 0 and 100. The closer it
is to 0, the more symmetric are the structures of the countries of interest.
The index is presented, for example, in CNB (2012) within the analysis of the
Czech Republic’s current alignment with the euro area. The obtained index
(normalized to [0; 1] interval) increased from 0.15 (2006) to 0.2 (2011) and
is interpreted as indicator of below-average structural similarity with the euro
area (the index value for Germany, Austria, and Slovenia, for instance, does
not surpass 0.1).
In order to calculate Landesmann index for comparison of the Belarusian
and Russian industry structures, we analyze the annual GDP composition of
the economies in 2009-2012. Industries are identified according to the first level
of the ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic
Activities) system. Figure 3.4 presents the values of the index in 2009-2012.
Figure 3.4: Landesmann structural index composition for Be-
larus/Russia in 2009-2012
Source: own calculations based on National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Be-
larus, Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation data.
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The structural difference between the Belarusian and Russian economies
is comparable to that between the Czech Republic and the euro area. The
major contribution to the index belongs to the manufacturing sector, which
accounts for more than 30% of the Belarusian value added, while in Russia
its share constitutes only 15%. Historically, Belarus has played the role of the
manufacturing hub, and still a number of major enterprises (i.e. related to the
oil industry) enter common production chains with the Russian suppliers of raw
materials. From another side, such disparity may contribute to misalignments
in the dynamics of exchange rates and terms of trade. Agriculture features the
second largest share in the structural gap between the economies. In Belarus,
this sector makes up more than 9% of the value added compared to only 3.5% in
Russia. In addition, the Belarusian agricultural industry is heavily subsidized
and regulated by the state and is characterized by low flexibility of prices and
labor. Increase in the economy’s structural misalignment (comparing 2009 and
2012) can be noted, mostly owing to the relative growth of the manufacturing
in Belarus; some convergence, meanwhile, was achieved within the construction
and retail trade sectors’ shares.
Intra-industry trade
Another approach to compare structures of the economies is to analyze bi-
lateral trade structure. Countries with a similar factor structure are likely to
have high share of intra-industry trade in total turnover. The Grubel-Lloyd in-
dex serves as a quantitative measure of this characteristics. For an i-th product,





where Xi,t - export of an i-th product and Mi,t - import of an i-th product.








where Xt + Mt represents total trade turnover in a given period. Application
of this index for the OCA analysis can be also found in CNB (2012), where
the Grubel-Lloyd index is calculated for the Czech Republic and several other
EU-members relative to the euro area trade turnover. The obtained results (for
2010 data) range from 50% (Portugal) to 70% (the Czech Republic, Germany,
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and Austria) for the two-digit SITC breakdown and decrease to 25% (Slovenia)
- 40% (the Czech Republic, Germany), when more detailed classification system
(CN8) is considered.
To obtain the intra-industry trade share in the total trade turnover between
Russia and Belarus, we consider bilateral trade statistics in 2008-2011. The
sectors are classified according to the Harmonized System Codes (HS07). We
calculate the index for two aggregation levels: AG2 (two-digit codes, breakdown
in 99 sectors) and AG6 (six-digit codes). The calculated values are presented
in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Grubel-Lloyd index (intra-industry share in the Belaru-
sian/Russian trade turnover) in 2008-2011
Source: own calculations based on UN Commodity Trade Statistics data
The share of the intra-industry trade between the countries is relatively low
(when compared to the euro area level), due to the prevalence of the energy-
related imports from Russia and limited production cooperation. Significant
difference between the intra-industry values for two- and six-digit aggrega-
tion levels indicates that vertical integration dominates; horizontal trade (i.e.
traded goods are of close nature/quality), which is characteristic for countries
with similar economy structures, occupies a minor part of the bilateral trade
turnover. Although, the Belarusian and Russian economies are integrated, the
degree of specialization is high, what could contribute to higher costs of the
possible monetary union.
Ownership links
We complete the analysis of structural alignment by considering the bilat-
eral ownership links. We employ the Balance of Payments statistics on FDI
inflows and investment income payments (Figure 3.6).
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Figure 3.6: FDI inflows from Russia and investment income payments
to Russia, % GDP
Source: Balance of Payments (NBB Statistics Database)
The ownership links between Russia and Belarus are strong relative to the
rest of the world (NBB Statistics Database, National Statistical Committee
of the Republic of Belarus). The annual FDI inflows from Russia made up
about 30% of the total inward investments to Belarus in 2012; in 2009-2011,
its share reached 70% of the FDI due to the operations involving Beltransgaz
shares. The income investment payments to Russia constituted around 32-35%
of the total investment income outflows in 2008-2012. The share of the Russian
capital in the stock FDI also varied around 30% in 2008-2012. At the same
time, relative to the GDP, the ownership links seem weaker: in 2012, with the
stock FDI constituting only 2.5% of the Belarusian output, annual FDI inflows
from and income payments to Russia amounted to around 1% of the output.
For comparison, the share of the FDI from the euro area in the Czech GDP is
around 50% (CNB 2012).
Summarizing the chapter, we cannot fully reject the hypothesis of signifi-
cant cyclical and structural misalignment between the Belarusian and Russian
economies. Correlation of the economic activity indicators over the analyzed
period constitutes above 60%. Exports are the most synchronized with the cor-
relation surpassing 90%. Yet, when accounted for the time-trend, correlation of
the output growth rates falls to 30%; in addition, the economies’ alignment has
decreased since the beginning of 2010. We showed that temporary (demand)
shocks were not symmetric, except for the recession period of 2008-2009, while
the correlation of the long-term (supply) shocks constituted about 50% in 2000-
2009, but has also declined in the recent years. We may, thus, conclude that
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origins of real and external demand shocks, hitting Belarus and Russia, are
most likely to be common, however, the transmission of shocks and policy re-
sponses to them differ. Structural misalignment, low share of intra-industry
trade, and still weak ownership links could also contribute to the increasing
asymmetry in 2010-2012.
Chapter 4
Alignment of the Monetary
Policies and Transmission
Mechanisms
Alignment of the monetary policy can be considered as another ”meta” OCA
criteria (Mongelli 2002) that implies shock synchronization as well as similarity
of the countries’ economic and financial structures. Hence, comparison of the
monetary policy and its transmission mechanisms is relevant from the perspec-
tive of the OCA analysis. First, discrepancy in the timing and the scope of the
authorities’ responses may indicate that the countries are subject to different
shocks. Second, misalignment in the monetary policy transmission points on
structural differences between the economies that result in disparate expecta-
tions of and reactions to the policy decisions. Additionally, a country suffering
from inconsistent and weak actions of the monetary authorities may benefit if
it adopts stricter monetary policy of the anchor-country. In this chapter, we
use two approaches to compare the monetary policies in Russia and Belarus.
First, we estimate monetary policy rules of the CBR and the NBB in order to
compare their cyclicality and focus. Second, we evaluate monetary VAR model
in order to 1)identify the most important transmission channels in Russia and
Belarus; 2)to determine the extent, to which the monetary policy instruments
have been used as shock-absorbers for the Belarusian economy; 3)measure im-
portance of the Russian shocks and the current Russian monetary policy for
Belarus.
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4.1 Approaches to the Empirical Analysis of the
Monetary Policy
4.1.1 Analysis of the Monetary Policy Rules
The Taylor rule approach (Taylor 1993) provides a simple framework to esti-
mate monetary policy rules. The basic specification represents a policy rule
(nominal interest rate) as a function of output gap and deviation of inflation
from the target. Although the Taylor rule may seem inferior to more sophis-
ticated optimal policy rules, it is widely considered as an adequate and ro-
bust measure of the central banks’ systematic behavior over the medium term.
Woodford (2001) points that the rule incorporates features of the optimal policy
by addressing fluctuations of both inflation and output and, thus, preventing
self-enforcing destabilization of the economy.
CNB (2012) use a simple backward-looking Taylor rule while comparing
cyclical positions of eight EU economies. For all countries, the equilibrium
real interest rate and inflation targets are fixed at 2% level, while response
coefficients to output and inflation gaps are both set equal to 0.5, following
the original work of Taylor (1993). Then, implied interest rates are estimated
for each country and their deviation from the implied euro area interest rate is
interpreted as a measure of cyclical misalignment.
A number of studies questioned linearity of the central banks’ response
functions and suggested alternative specifications that could capture asymmet-
ric monetary policy responses. The behavior of the monetary authorities may
change depending on the direction and the magnitude of the fluctuations: up-
ward deviations of inflation from the target may induce more aggressive policy
than inflation undershooting; it may be also the case that the monetary policy
is different in recessions compared to expansions. For example, Vasicek (2010)
investigates whether monetary policy is asymmetric in the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland using two empirical approaches: 1) monetary policy rules
are estimated assuming nonlinear forms of the underlying policy equations (the
central bank reacting not only to inflation deviations, but also to its volatility)
or economic structures (nonlinear Philips curve); 2) monetary policy rules are
allowed to switch between two different regimes, which are identified based on
the value of a threshold variable (inflation gap, output gap or financial distress
serve as alternative transition variables). Jawadi et al. (2011) apply a similar
approach to estimate response functions featured by the central banks of the
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BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries in 1990:1-2008:4. In order to
account for gradual changes in the monetary policy, the rules are estimated us-
ing smooth transition regression (STR) specification. The authors find strong
evidence for the nonlinearity. In particular, regarding Russia, the economic
growth is reported to be the major driver of the monetary policy asymmetry
(output growth rate below -1.4% being the threshold).
4.1.2 Evaluation of Monetary Policy Transmission
Monetary policy transmission determines how a monetary shock disseminates
in the economy. Comprising a number of interconnected channels and various
stages, the transmission mechanism is always complex and uncertain in reality.
In theory and empirical works, though, it is common to distinguish between
different transmission channels: interest rate, credit, exchange rate, and expec-
tations. The interest rate channel acts through price rigidity. Monetary expan-
sion leads to temporary decrease of the real interest rate, what positively affects
investment and private consumption, thus, contributing to the overall increase
of output. The credit channel operates via nonprice features, which determine
credit availability. The traditional view on the credit channel is associated with
asymmetric information and credit rationing. Monetary expansion reduces the
default risk and the external finance premia, and eases the adverse selection cri-
teria; the credit supply increases and stimulates borrowing and investment. In
the emerging and transition economies, the effectiveness of the credit channel
may be a consequence of the directed crediting. If the economic activity does
not respond significantly to the changes in credit prices, monetary authorities
may resort to directly controlling the credit supply by changing the banks’
loanable resources. The exchange rate channel is important for open econo-
mies; yet, it may amplify as well as weaken the policy rate impulse. Monetary
easing theoretically results in depreciation of the national currency; provided
rigid domestic prices, depreciation benefits exporters and may contribute to
the output growth. However, if price adjustment is fast, inflation rapidly wipes
out advantages for exporters. Moreover, in case the economy is exposed to
the exchange-rate risk via FX borrowing, depreciation of the national currency
negatively affects the balance sheets of the firms and reduces wealth of the
households. Expectations channel may ensure fast and powerful transmission
of the monetary policy, under condition that the monetary authorities directly
influence expectations by setting credible explicit targets. However, when the
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credibility is low, expectation channel, may, on the contrary undermine policy
actions of the central banks. For instance, monetary expansion under high in-
flation expectations may result in the indexation or the currency substitution
and, thus, have negligible or even negative effect on the real economy.
Starting from the seminal work of Sims (1980), VAR models have become
common tools for analyzing transmission of monetary policy. Below we high-
light several empirical works relevant to the OCA studies as well as those refer-
ring to the particularities of transmission mechanisms in Russia and Belarus.
Smets & Peersman (2001) investigate the importance of the common Euro-
pean monetary policy on the aggregate output and prices in the euro area coun-
tries. As a benchmark specification they use a monetary VAR model with en-
dogenous (the euro area variables) and exogenous (the global economy) blocks.
Having identified common monetary policy shocks, the authors then study
their effects on output and prices of selected member-countries. A number of
empirical works investigate monetary policy transmission in new or potential
members of the euro area. Mackowiak (2005) uses a VAR specification with do-
mestic and foreign blocks to decompose by origin the sources of the variation in
output and price level in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (CHP) and
to measure relative importance of the euro area shocks for these countries. The
German economy is used as a proxy for the euro area given strong ties between
this country and the CHP economies and considerable weight of Germany in
the EMU. The study concludes on significant effect of the euro area shocks
on output and prices in CHP; moreover, it finds that euro area interest rate
shocks have the same qualitative effects in CHP as in Germany, thus, pointing
on the concurrence of the monetary policy transmission. Horvath & Rusnak
(2009) apply a similar approach to analyze monetary transmission mechanisms
in Slovakia. Their empirical results suggest that prior to the Euro adoption
(January 2009) prices in Slovakia had been already largely driven by the ECB
monetary policy shocks and that the Slovak Central Bank’s monetary policy
rule had followed closely the ECB’s interest rates. In one of the recent papers,
Darvas (2012) analyzes the monetary policy transmission in the CHP by the
means of a time-varying VAR model. The author uses the methodology, which
assumes that the reduced-form VAR parameters follow driftless random walks
and applies the Kalman filter for maximum likelihood estimation and infer-
ence. His study indicates increasing impact of the monetary shocks over time
in both the transition economies and the EMU and concludes on the growing
strength of the domestic monetary policies. The major caveat is, though, the
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exclusion of the foreign sector from the VAR specification, which does not allow
differentiating between the impact of domestic monetary shocks and those of
the euro area.
Empirical studies comparing monetary transmission mechanisms in Russia
and Belarus were conducted as part of the OCA research in 2000-2003. Teresh-
enko (2002a) estimates monetary VAR models separately for both countries and
notes significant differences in the impacts of interest rates and money supply
on output and prices. As we are unaware of later studies that directly aimed
at comparing transmission mechanisms in Belarus and Russia, we further sum-
marize some separate findings on the countries’ monetary policy. Horvath &
Maino (2006) estimate a VAR specification to analyze monetary transmission
channels in Belarus in 1995-2005. They emphasize high pass-through of the
exchange rate to both prices and output and note insignificance of monetary
policy shocks for the real sector. The credit channel is reported operational to
the extent of the authorities’ intervention in the loan market. Abakumova &
Komkov (2011) fit different VAR specifications to the Belarusian monthly time-
series (2003-2010) to determine importance of the interest rate, the credit, and
the exchange rate transmission channels for output variability. As in the pre-
vious studies, Abakumova & Komkov (2011) find no statistically significant
impact of the refinancing and the interbank rates on the GDP, but observe
some progress in the interest rate pass-through to the IPI.
As to the specific features of the monetary transmission in Russia, ear-
lier studies (Vdovichenko & Voronina 2004; Vymyatnina 2005) report weak
efficiency of both credit and interest rate transmission channels, explaining it
by high level of dollarization. Recent studies (Balkovskaya & Filneva 2012;
Leonteva 2012) observe some improvement in operationability of both trans-
mission channels, which is still limited owing to high liquidity of the Russian
banks, market concentration in the banking industry, and financial markets
imperfections. Another factor is rigid loan pricing by the banks, which due to
asymmetric information and substantial credit risk are unwilling to transmit
lower policy rates to their clients (Sapunkova 2010). However, in 2010, the CBR
claimed to gradually shift from the exchange-rate to the inflation targeting with
the aim to achieve the regime change by 2015 (CBR 2012). Henceforth, in the
nearest future, one may expect the increase of the interest rate efficiency for
the monetary transmission in Russia.
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4.2 Estimation of the Monetary Policy Rules
4.2.1 Models specification
Analysis of the monetary policy rules of the NBB and the CBR is conducted in
two stages. First, we calculate implied policy interest rates using the Taylor
rule with the same fixed parameters for both countries to compare cyclical po-
sitions of the Belarusian and Russian monetary authorities. Then, we estimate
the monetary policy responses using the Taylor rule framework and assuming
asymmetric reactions during recessions and expansions.
The implied interest rates are calculated following the classic Taylor rule
(Taylor (1993)):
it = req + πt + 0.5(πt − π∗t ) + 0.5(yt − y∗t ) (4.1)
Here it - nominal policy interest rate; req - equilibrium interest rate; (πt − π∗t )
- deviation of inflation from the target, (yt − y∗t ) - output gap.
Further, for the policy rule estimation, we apply a linear Taylor rule that
accounts for policy inertia and is defined as follows:
it = ρ ∗ it−1 + (1− ρ)[α + β(πt − π∗t ) + γ(yt − y∗t )] + ut (4.2)
it - nominal policy interest rate; (πt − π∗t ) - deviation of inflation from the
target, (yt − y∗t ) - output gap, ut - i.i.d. disturbance term. Parameter ρ rep-
resents interest rate persistence, its high value may reflect unwillingness of the
monetary authorities to frequently change the nominal interest rate; constant
α can be interpreted as equilibrium real interest rate; β and γ characterize the
strength of the monetary authorities’ reaction to fluctuations of inflation and
output. In case γ = 0 (is insignificant), β should be bigger than one as the real
interest rate should increase in response to higher inflation in order to prevent
further destabilization of the economy.
For the OCA analysis it is of particular interest to compare monetary policy
rules during different stages of the business cycle in order to infer on the impor-
tance of monetary tools for the adjustment of the economy. (4.2) is modified
to account for asymmetric responses during recessions (regime 1) and expan-
sions (regime 2). For this purpose, we estimate a nonlinear Taylor rule that
differentiates between the two regimes.
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it = I ∗ [ρ1 ∗ it−1 + (1− ρ1)[α1 + β1(πt − π∗t ) + γ1(yt − y∗t )]]+ (4.3)
+(1− I) ∗ [ρ2 ∗ it−1 + (1− ρ2)[α2 + β2(πt − π∗t ) + γ2(yt − y∗t )]] + ut;
I = 1 under regime 1 and is set to 0 for regime 2.
(4.3) is estimated using nonlinear least squares method. For a robustness
check, (4.2) and (4.3) are extended to include other variables that might have
affected behavior of the central banks: nominal exchange rate change, reserves
growth rate, and money supply growth rate. These indicators had been used
by both the NBB and the CBR as either direct or intermediate targets during
some years between 2000 and 2012.
4.2.2 Data and Results
We use monthly data for both countries spanning from 2000:1 to 2012:12. As
the policy interest rate, we chose the refinancing rate (monthly average, an-
nualized), which represents the reference rate set by the NBB and the CBR for
the operations involving liquidity provision to banks. To obtain annual infla-
tion we take year-on-year logarithmic differences of the CPI. As a proxy for
the inflation target, we use inflation trend obtained with the Hodrick-Prescott
filter. Such approach is motivated by absence of explicit inflation targets for
the early periods under study as both central banks officially targeted the nom-
inal exchange rates. Moreover, such proxy tracks dynamics of the target. For
Belarus, due to the presence of evident structural breaks, the target was calcu-
lated separately for three periods: 2000(1):2004(6) - period of macroeconomic
stabilization with gradual decrease of the inflation target; 2004(7)-2011(1) -
period of relative macroeconomic stability; 2011(2)-2012(4) - period following
the currency crisis, the inflation target is fixed at 22% according to the explicit
goal of the NBB. Seasonally adjusted monthly IPI is taken as a measure of
output, and output gap is derived by the means of the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
For nonlinear specification we differentiate between two regimes: recessions
and expansions. We define a recession as a period when the cyclical component
of the output had negative growth rates and, consequently, an expansion as a
period of increasing economic activity. For this procedure, we take the GDP as
an output measure, since it characterizes more fully the state of the economy
and is less noisy compared to the IPI. We proceed with the output gap (rather
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than with the growth rates) as both the Russian and Belarusian economies
had had few absolute declines of the economic activity during the period under
study. The output gap was obtained for the quarterly GDP with the Hodrick-
Prescott filter and the regimes were identified following the Zellner’s procedure
(Zellner et al. 1990). The method consists in several steps. First, turning
points of the business cycles (either peaks or troughs) are determined (a point
is denoted as a trough if it is preceded and followed by two consecutive quar-
ters with higher level of economic activity; peaks are defined accordingly). In
addition, it is ensured that peaks and troughs alternate. Then, a period from
a peak to a trough is marked as a recession and a period between a trough
and a peak - as an expansion. After completing the Zellner’s procedure, we
interpolated the obtained series to fit monthly data.
The implied interest rates are calculated as in (4.1). To facilitate compa-
rability, the CBR target is used for both countries; equilibrium natural interest
rate is set at 3.5%. Figure 4.1 depicts the implied policy rates and presents
deviations of the implied interest rates from the actual refinancing rates set by
the NBB and the CBR in 2001-2012. Deviations are computed as simple differ-
ences between the refinancing rate and the implied rate. A negative deviation
means that the actual rate was lower than the one prescribed by the Taylor
rule.
Figure 4.1: Implied policy rates and their deviations from the actual
refinancing rates of the NBB and the CBR in 2001-2012
Source: own computations.
Following the period of macroeconomic stabilization in Belarus and agree-
ments on the Union State in the early 2000s, we observe high convergence of
the economies’ cyclical positions from 2005 up to 2010. The alignment of the
implied rates indicates that the countries featured similar shocks to output and
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prices. It also points on the willingness of the NBB to follow the inflation tar-
gets perceived by the CBR. Importantly, the policy rates moved closely together
also during the crisis of 2008-2009 and the early recovery period in 2010. Such
relationship was disrupted in 2011 due to the currency crisis in Belarus that
was accompanied by the burst of inflation. Misalignment in the behavior of
the refinancing rates after 2010 could be caused by differences in the monetary
policy transmission. While in Russia, post-crisis monetary easing facilitated
output recovery; in Belarus, it contributed to higher inflation and devaluation
expectations that forwarded the currency crisis.
We continue with estimating the policy rules for the NBB and the CBR. We
start by fitting linear models to the countries’ data. Table 4.1 presents the
results of the OLS-estimation with robust standard errors.
Table 4.1: Estimation results: Linear monetary policy rules
Country ρ α β γ ν
(it−1) (req) (πt − π∗t ) (yt − y∗t ) reserves
Belarus
coefficient 0.875*** 0.153*** 0.765** -0.443 -0.083***




Ljung-Box Q(12) 131.24 [0.000]
Russia
coefficient 0.985*** 0.053 4.219*** -0.093 –




Ljung-Box Q(12) 32.90 [0.001]
Source: own calculations.
*** - significance at 90% level, ** - significance at 95% level
Before proceeding with the analysis, several notes should be made. First,
the coefficient (ρ) related to policy inertia may be overestimated as we use
monthly series, where policy rates are autocorrelated by construction (pointed
by Vasicek (2010)). That is also reflected in Portmanteau tests for the re-
maining autocorrelation in the models’ residuals. Second, the constant’s (α)
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interpretation as the equilibrium real interest rate should be careful as we use
Hodrick-Prescott trend to capture changing inflation targets; in this way, we
assume time-variability of the real interest rate; in addition, mis-estimation of
the inflation target could have taken place.
The parameters obtained with the linear specification indicate that both
central banks changed interest rates in response to inflation fluctuations but
not to deviations of output, with the CBR reacting more aggressively. Addition-
ally, during the analyzed period the NBB responded significantly to the changes
in the foreign reserves; policy rate slightly increased with the diminishing re-
serves, as the latter could have resulted in forced devaluation of the BYR and
consequently created inflation pressures. Other variables: money supply and
nominal exchange rate change - turned out to be correlated with inflation and
insignificant for the policy rules of both central banks.
Parameter stability over time is checked with the CUSUM test that obtains
a vector of one-step ahead forecast errors by running a series of regressions
with increasing number of observations. For both countries, the parameter
stability is not rejected. Non-linearity tests (RESET and squares) reject linear
specification for the Belarusian data. The tests show that positive deviations
of inflation from the target induce stricter responses of the NBB. Regarding the
response function of the CBR, its linearity cannot be rejected at 95% confidence
level.
We further estimate a nonlinear model that allows for asymmetric monetary
policy reactions in recessions and expansions. The results are presented in the
Table 4.2. The nonlinear specifications for both countries feature higher log-
likelihood and smaller standard error of the residuals compared to the linear
models. Autocorrelation in the residuals for the Belarusian data (as indicated
by the Ljung-Box Test) remains high, but it is likely to be caused by the data
characteristics rather than the estimation approach.
The reference rates of the NBB are more predictable by the proposed model
during recessions: all regression coefficients are significant, while for the expan-
sion regime only the autoregressive component (ρ) is important. Such result
may be attributed to heterogeneous behavior of the NBB within the periods of
growing economic activity. For instance, the central bank may have applied dif-
ferent response function, when output was increasing but remained below the
desired level, compared to the one employed during near-the-peak times. At
the time of recessions, the actions of the Belarusian monetary authorities were
more uniform. In 2000-2012, downturns were usually characterized/caused by
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Table 4.2: Estimation results: Asymmetric monetary policy rules
Country ρ α β γ ν
(it−1) (req) (πt − π∗t ) (yt − y∗t ) reserves
Belarus
Recession 78 obs
coefficient 0.846*** 0.151*** 0.771*** -1.082* -0.105***
standard error (0.038) (0.032) (0.142) (0.587) (0.035)
Expansion 78 obs
coefficient 0.935*** 0.101 0.721 -0.825 -0.002




Ljung-Box Q(12) 117.69 [0.000]
Russia
Recession 52 obs
coefficient 0.988*** 0.035 4.588 -2.407* -
standard error (0.008) (0.130) (3.718) (1.312) -
Expansion 104 obs
coefficient 0.985*** 0.027 3.936** 2.849** -




Ljung-Box Q(12) 23.96 [0.020]
Source: own calculations.
*** - significance at 90% level, ** - significance at 95% level
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inflation bursts and reserves depletion, which induced the NBB to increase the
interest rate. Such particularity also explains significant negative coefficient in
front of the output gap, as the actions of the NBB were focused on stabilization
of prices.
For Russia, the monetary policy response function is more in line with
the traditional view. Expansionary periods witnessed statistically significant
positive reaction of the CBR to the fluctuations of both inflation and output
in order to prevent further destabilization. Insignificant coefficients during
recessions may be related to changeable nature of downturns that induced
different responses of the CBR throughout the analyzed period or can reflect
the preference of other monetary tools for adjustment needs.
As a summary of the current section, we would like to highlight the follow-
ing observations. Conforming to our previous analysis in Chapter 3, cyclical
positions of the Belarusian and Russian economies, as identified by the implied
policy rates, were close in 2005-2010, thus suggesting strong alignment of real
and nominal shocks. Discrepancy in 2011-2012 may have resulted from different
transmission of the after-crisis monetary easing in Belarus and Russia. By esti-
mating asymmetric Taylor rules we are able to obtain some additional evidence
on the differences between the monetary policy functions of the NBB and CBR.
In Belarus, the interest rate was primarily used to control inflation fluctuations
and possible depletion of foreign reserves during downturns. Its reaction to
the output dynamics turned out to be insignificant in both regimes. In Rus-
sia, during periods of growing economic activity, the CBR positively reacted to
both inflation and output gaps and, closer than the NBB, followed the Taylor
rule. These results favor the currency union with Russia. First, the interest
rates in Belarus responded, above all, to temporary nominal shocks, which are
likely to become less significant following monetary integration with Russia.
This feature decreases the likelihood of high costs due to cyclical misalign-
ment. Moreover, the Russian monetary policy during expansionary periods
was more consistent aiming at macroeconomic stabilization. Consequently, the
possible costs of the monetary union could be offset by the gains associated
with importing lower inflation. Nonetheless, operationability of the CBR policy
rule as a recovery tool during recessions was not confirmed by our estimations
and could be a point of concern.
4. Alignment of the Monetary Policies and Transmission Mechanisms 45
4.3 Monetary policy transmission
4.3.1 Model specification
As a benchmark model we choose a VAR specification with domestic and foreign
blocks, following Smets & Peersman (2001) and Mackowiak (2005). This model
has been widely applied in the studies of monetary policy transmission mecha-
nisms in small open economies (Horvath & Rusnak 2009; Havránek et al. 2012,
see), as it allows controlling for the effects of external shocks. Hence, apart
from checking the hypothesis on monetary policy alignment, we should be also
able to complement our previous findings on shocks synchronization by mea-
suring portion of variation in the Belarusian variables that can be explained by
the Russian data.
A structural model for two economies can be specified as follows (omitting
constant and exogenous variables):
p∑
j=0
A(j)y(t− j) = e(t) (4.4)
Both y(t) and e(t) - are [M x 1] vectors with M being the number of variables;
y(t) represents a vector of endogenous variables, A(j) is a [M x M ] matrix
of parameters with A(0) being non-singular, e(t) - data-generating structural
disturbances (changes in technology, tastes, and policy). e(t) are normally
distributed with zero mean and constant variance normalized to one.
E(e(t)e(t)′|y(t− j), j > 0) = IM .




B(j)y(t− j) + u(t) (4.5)
B(j) = A(0)−1A(j); u(t) = A(0)−1e(t); u(t) are normally distributed with
zero mean and constant variance:
E(u(t)u(t)′| y(t− j), j > 0) = Ω = A(0)−1A(0)−1′ (4.6)
The above relationships will be used to recover structural residuals and coeffi-
cients.
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We can partition (4.5) into three sectors: the world (1), the Russian econ-






















We assume that the Belarusian shocks affect neither the Russian, nor the world
economies, while the inverse holds. As to the effect of the Russian shocks
on the world economy, no prior restrictions are imposed as it is likely that
fluctuations in Russia might alter behavior of some world variables. Thus, we
impose block-exogeneity restrictions on matrices B(j) only relative to Belarus
by setting B13(j) = 0 and B23(j) = 0, j = ¯0, p.
We analyze dynamic interaction of the following variables: output, price
level, short-term interest rate, monetary aggregate, and nominal exchange rate
for the Russian and Belarusian economies and crude oil prices. Further in the
text, the variables entering each sector are denoted as follows:
y1(t) = oil(t);
y2(t) = xru(t), pru(t), iru(t),mru(t), erru(t);
y3(t) = xby(t), pby(t), iby(t),mby(t), erby(t);
where x(t) denotes output, p(t) - price level, i(t) - short-term interest rate,
m(t) - monetary aggregate, er(t) - exchange rate, oil(t) - crude oil price.
In order to interpret the model, one needs to recover structural coefficients
and shocks. Since estimation of a reduced form yields fewer coefficients, we need
to impose a number of restrictions on structural parameters of the model. For
a system to be just-identified, M ∗ (M−1)/2 restrictions are to be imposed (M
being the number of variables). For identification we apply Cholesky recursive
scheme. Technically, Cholesky procedure decomposes a matrix X on a lower
triangular matrix and its conjugate transpose, such that X = L ∗ L′. (4.6)
describes the same relationship between the variance-covariance matrix (Ω) of
the observed residuals and A(0)−1. Thus, in order to derive A(0)−1, one needs
just to perform a Cholesky decomposition of Ω. Upper-triangular form of the
inverse A(0) matrix may have a plausible economic interpretation. From (4.5),
ut = A(0)
−1et, i.e. observed shocks are combinations of structural disturbances.
Restrictions are imposed on the matrix A(0)−1, in such way that the structural
4. Alignment of the Monetary Policies and Transmission Mechanisms 47
shocks to some variables (lower-order) are not allowed to affect other (upper-
order) variables contemporaneously. Restricted A(0)−1 for the baseline model
is presented below from upper- to lower-ordered variables:
oil(t), xru(t), pru(t), iru(t), erru(t),mru(t),










1 0 0 ... 0
a2,1 0 0 ... 0
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a10,1 a10,2 a10,3 ... 0











Here, µM(t) ⊂ u(t) - observed shocks to individual variables (residuals of the es-
timated VAR model in the reduced form) and εM(t) ⊂ e(t) - structural shocks.
According to such ordering, the lowest-order variable (the Belarusian mone-
tary aggregate) reacts contemporaneously to structural shocks in all variables
of higher order, while the highest-order variable (crude oil price) features to-
tally independent shock and may be influenced only by lags of some Russian
indicators. The exchange rate is ordered before the monetary aggregate, since
both the CBR and the NBB officially targeted the former during most part of
the analyzed period and attempted to limit its fluctuations. Bearing in mind
that estimation results may be sensitive to changing the identification scheme,
we impose alternative orderings (with different relative positions of exchange
rate, interest rate, and monetary aggregate) for a robustness check.
Stability of a VAR model is viewed as an important issue, since non-stable
specifications may result in spurious correlations and incorrect inference. Con-
sider a reduced-form VAR as in (4.5). Its deterministic part can be rewritten
using a lag operator as
B(L)y(t) = (IM −B1L−B2L2 − ...−BpLp)y(t) (4.7)
By calculating the roots of (4.7), one can examine the stability of a VAR. The
inverse polynomial of (4.7) is defined as
P (z) = (IM −B1z −B2z2 − ...−Bpzp)
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The characteristic roots of |P (z)| = 0 provide information about stability of the
model. The necessary and sufficient condition for stability is that all roots of
the inverse polynomial lie outside the unit circle. That implies the system, on
the whole, is stationary and the series do not diverge to infinity due to shocks.
In the empirical literature there has been no general consensus on whether
it is necessary to difference non-stationary time-series (such as output, price
level, etc.) before using them in a VAR model. Sims (1980) advised against dif-
ferencing as it induced information loss, in particularly, regarding comovement
of variables and possible cointegrating relationships. It is also recommended
against detrending the series, as a VAR specification allows approximating for
a trending variable (Enders 2009). A VECM can serve as a solution for non-
stationary data. Yet, stationarizing a model by the means of cointegration
operators is often unnecessary when it appears that the series are comoving.
Morever, in small samples it might be statistically difficult to decide on the
presence of significant cointegrating relationships, while setting the cointegrat-
ing restriction inappropriately could lead to incorrect conclusions. Following
the presented argumentation, it is common to estimate VARs in levels and allow
for only implicit cointegrating relationships in the data.
4.3.2 Data
We input monthly time-series spanning from 2000:M1 and 2012:M12. Table 4.3
provides a brief description of the variables used in the baseline model and their
alternatives for a robustness check.




Interest rate refinancing rate interbank 1-day MM rate
Monetary aggregate M2 credit to private sector
Exchange rate nominal
exchange rate index
World economy crude oil price index
Source: own compilation.
In the baseline model, the IPI proxies the output; the choice of this indicator
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was motivated by its availability on monthly basis. Besides, the application of
the GDP as an alternative measure bears a number of caveats: apart from be-
ing subject to the interpolation bias, models employing this indicator ex-post
could lead to incorrect inference, as the most recent GDP measures are usually
unavailable at the point of the monetary decision-making. Notwithstanding,
the IPI also features important drawbacks: first, it does not fully characterize
the economy; second, the data on the industrial production is usually noisy.
To control for the first problem, a VAR specification with the GDP is estimated
for a robustness check (quarterly GDP series were converted to monthly using
cubic spline interpolation method). To account for high-frequency fluctuations
in the IPI series, we employed available seasonally-adjusted time-series and per-
formed additional smoothening via the Butterworth low-pass filter. The filter
approximates an ideal square-wave filter, which allows frequencies over a certain
range to pass at full strength while stopping all others. We set parameter order
to n = 8 and cutoff value to 67 in order to exclude short-term fluctuations.
Price level is characterized by the CPI for both countries. To complement
the analysis we also estimate a VAR with the PPI for Russia as a price variable.
Unlike the Belarusian PPI inflation, which moved closely with the CPI, changes
of the PPI and the CPI in Russia were not strongly symmetric. Moreover,
the PPI is mostly composed of tradable-goods prices and, thus, it is a more
informative indicator, when we aim on measuring importance of the Russian
shocks for the Belarusian economy.
The refinancing rates set by the CBR and the NBB enter the model as mon-
etary policy rule variables. Besides, we estimate a VAR with the Russian in-
terbank money-market 1-day interest rate to additionally infer on the speed of
the Russian monetary policy transmission in Belarus.
We use the monetary aggregate M2 (monetary base plus on-demand, saving,
and term deposits in the national currency) for both countries as measure
of money supply in the baseline specification. As an alternative proxy we
take domestic credit (to nonfinancial private organizations and households)
that allows estimating the role of credit availability in the Belarusian and the
Russian economies, while eliminating the effect of the crediting to the state
sector. In 2010-2012, volumes of credit to nonfinancial state enterprises in
Belarus constituted more than 40% of the total domestic credit to nonfinancial
entities and households (in 2005-2009, its share made up slightly more than
20%). In Russia, the corresponding indicator has steadily decreased and in
2010-2012 was equal, on average, to 1.4%.
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Exchange rate dynamics is described by the index of nominal exchange
rate (foreign currency per 1 unit of the national currency). For Belarus, we
employ the effective exchange rate, while for Russia - nominal USD/RUR rate.
As a variable characterizing the world, we chose crude oil price index (Brendt
prices), since oil and oil products constitute about 50% of the Russian exports
and account for around 40% of both the Belarusian imports and exports.
The sources of the country data are the online statistics databases of the
NBB and the CBR; the IPI time-series are available in the online database of the
UNECE (the United National Economic Commission for Europe).
In total, we perform estimations for four slightly different datasets:
 baseline model with the variables as in the first column in the Table 4.3;
 a specification with the domestic credit to the private firms and the house-
holds to have an additional insight on the credit channel operationability;
 a specification with the PPI as the price level proxy and the interbank
interest rate as the policy rule for Russia to better capture penetration
of the Russian shocks in the Belarusian economy;
 a specification with the GDP as a broader output measure.
We estimate the first three specifications in levels to exploit maximum informa-
tion available, while, in the fourth option, we detrend GDP with the Hodrick-
Prescott filter and take year-on-year differences of other time-series to control
for possible spurious regressions.
4.3.3 Results and Discussion
The section compares monetary policy transmission in Belarus and Russia;
evaluates relative importance of the Belarusian domestic monetary policy tools
for adjustment to shocks and estimates the portion of the economic fluctuations
in Belarus that are due to foreign disturbances.
The variables entering the baseline specification are sited in Table 4.3. All
the series (except for the interest rates) are in logarithms. Prior to the VAR-
estimation, we conducted Johansen cointegration test (Table A.1 in the Ap-
pendix A), both Trace and Lmax tests indicated the presence of cointegrating
relationships; thus, we are likely to get a stable system when estimating the
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VAR in levels. Figure 4.2 depicts plots of the series entering the baseline spec-
ification (except for the interest rates, the series were seasonally differenced to
ensure better comparability between the countries).
Figure 4.2: The time-series entering the baseline VAR model, %
Source: NBB Statistics Database, CBR Statistics Database, National Statistical Committee
of the Republic of Belarus, Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation.
We impose a block-exogeneity restriction on the Belarusian variables enter-
ing the Russian and the world blocks. Beforehand, we conducted a Granger
causality test, which confirmed insignificance of the Belarusian variables (ex-
cept for the IPI) for the foreign indicators (Table A.1 in the Appendix A). The
test was performed on the differenced series, because, for the integrated data,
the usual asymptotic distribution of the test statistic may not be valid under
the null hypothesis. We estimate VAR with a constant and a trend and set the
lag length to 2 according to the Schwarz information criterion. Lag length of 2
seemed also plausible based on the Ljung-Box Test of residuals. The test indi-
cated autocorrelation only for the IPI and the Russian CPI residuals (at 0.05%
confidence level); the systematic relationship in the error term is probably the
result of the imperfect adjustment procedures. We decided not to correct for
that problem by overparameterizing equations for other variables, as estimated
coefficients remain unbiased under autocorrelation, though no longer efficient.
The test of the VAR roots reported that the eigenvalues of the inverse polyno-
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mial are outside the unit circle. Generated impulse responses converge to zero.
Thus, we conclude on the stability of the system and possibility for further
inference.
The identification scheme was applied as described in the previous section.
Figure 4.3-Figure 4.4 below depict impulse responses to the structural interest
rate shocks in Belarus and Russia and allow comparing the monetary policy
transmission channels in the countries. These and further figures show the
generated impulse response (light blue line), the median of 100 impulse response
replications (bold red line), and 90% confidence bands (dashed lines) obtained
with the bootstrapping procedure. In the text, we present impulse responses for
the baseline model. The results from the alternative estimations together with
the code can be found in the electronic supplement (ch4/mp transmission).
Figure 4.3: Impulse responses to a refinancing rate shock in Russia (1
st.dev shock), units
Source: own computations.
The policy interest rate increase has statistically significant negative im-
pact on the Russian output and money supply with the latter enforcing the
transmission. The effect on the output peaks in 10 months after the refinanc-
ing rate shock and dies out in 1.5 years. Reaction of the nominal exchange
rate is on the edge of significance. Rather than appreciating, it reaches a
negative peak 10 months after the interest rate rise, since its dynamics is re-
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lated with the expectations about the output activity: projected lower pro-
duction results in lower demand for the RUR and its consequent depreciation.
The response of the CPI is not significant, what may have been caused by
the misspecification of the price level equation (above, we reported remain-
ing autocorrelation in this series). With the alternative variables, somewhat
stronger responses of the CPI to the policy rate shock can be obtained. When
credit is considered instead of the money aggregate M2, the CPI still fluc-
tuates in response, but features a trough (on the border of the significance
band) 7 months after a positive interest rate shock (see electronic supplement
ch4/mp transmission/output/priv credit.html). The reaction of the PPI to the
interbank interest rate change is more clear with a bell-shaped impulse response
reaching a trough in 10 months and returning to zero in 2 years (Figure A.1).
Figure 4.4: Impulse responses to a refinancing rate shock in Belarus
(1 st.dev shock), units
Source: own computations.
In Belarus, the refinancing rate shock is less persistent than in Russia and,
according to the baseline model, affects significantly only M2. The money
supply initially increases as the amount of deposits in the national currency
may go up following higher interest rates; but after 5 months reaches a trough
(due to decrease in banks’ liquidity and credit contraction). The effect on the
output is insignificant, pointing on lower than in Russia sensitivity to the credit
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costs and may be related to bigger volumes of directed crediting. Responses of
the CPI and the nominal exchange rate are clear, but significant only at 85%
confidence level. Difference in the RUR and BYR exchange rate reactions to the
interest rate shock are noticeable: increase of the NBB refinancing rate, through
the expectations channel, leads to the currency appreciation (revaluation) that
peaks in 9 months and augments the effect of the interest rate shock.
Following previous studies on the monetary policy transmission mechanism
in Belarus and Russia, we also analyze the pass-through of money supply shock
to output and prices (Figure 4.5-Figure 4.7).
Figure 4.5: Impulse responses to a money supply shock in Russia (1
st.dev shock), units
Source: own computations.
A shock to the money supply in Russia results in statistically significant
feedback of real and nominal variables with a comparable length of transmis-
sion to the interest rate shocks: the peaks of output and price level deviations
happen in 7-8 months after the money supply impulse. Nominal exchange rate
appreciates in response to the positive outlook for output dynamics. When
credit to private sector is considered instead of M2, the generated impulse re-
sponses do not vary from those obtained with the baseline version. In the
specification with the PPI and the interbank interest rate, the response of the
latter is fast (with a peak in 2 months) and strongly significant. It can indi-
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cate that change in the money supply has been employed by the CBR as an
alternative monetary policy instrument and has been transmitted rapidly in
the economy through the money market.
Figure 4.6: Impulse responses to a money supply shock in Belarus (1
st.dev shock), units
Source: own computations.
In Belarus, a shock to the money supply generates no or weakly significant
responses of nominal and real variables. A stronger feedback is obtained when
credit to private sector (firms and households) is considered instead of the
monetary aggregate M2. Indirectly, it points on low efficiency of credits to
the state enterprises. The increase in the credit availability for private sector,
amplified by the exchange rate depreciation (devaluation), stimulates output
and contributes to increase in price level, which in its turn induces the policy
rate to increase. Thus, we can conclude that the NBB may influence output
dynamics by changing credit availability and, in this way, affecting the internal
demand. Notwithstanding, this measure can have only a short-term positive
effect.
Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 present the variance decomposition of output and
prices. In the short term (6 months) neither of the monetary policy tools is
important for the output variability in both countries. In the medium term
(24 months), the reference rate and the money supply contribute the most to
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Figure 4.7: Impulse responses to a credit shock in Belarus (1 st.dev
shock), units
Source: own computations.
the forecast error of the Russian production (51%, with the refinancing rate
being the most important). Low contribution of the nominal exchange rate
shocks indicates that the RUR exchange rate is mainly a shock absorber for
the Russian economy, rather than shock generator. In Belarus, own monetary
policy instruments remain insignificant for production, which is in large driven
by the change in the Russian real and nominal variables.
Regarding price level dynamics in both countries, CPI variance is mostly de-
termined by its own shocks, hence, suggesting preponderance of expectations.
Changes in the Russian money supply generate about 25% of CPI forecast er-
ror in both Russia and Belarus in the medium term. Meanwhile, the share
of domestic monetary policy instruments in the Belarusian prices variability
constitutes 4%. Small weight of the own monetary tools in the variance of
the Belarusian output and prices can be justified by importance of the Russian
shocks for the Belarusian economy (it is explored in more detail below). There-
fore, when orthogonal shocks are considered, the ”value added” of the original
Belarusian disturbances becomes small.
By considering effects of domestic shocks to output and prices (Figure 4.8-
Figure 4.11) we may conclude on the significance of various monetary policy
4. Alignment of the Monetary Policies and Transmission Mechanisms 57
Table 4.4: Variance decomposition of output
ipiRuSa
Period oil ipiRuSa cpiRu refRu M2Ru ernRu
6 [0.2220] [ 0.6862] [0.0065] [0.0387] [0.0442] [0]
24 [0.0977] [ 0.3957] [0.1038] [0.2470] [0.1451] [0.0107]
ipiBySa
Period oil ipiRuSa cpiRu refRu M2Ru ernRu
6 [0.2037] [ 0.2145] [0.0261] [0.0186] [0.0183] [0.0027]
24 [0.1299] [ 0.2304] [0.0907] [0.1611] [0.1579] [0.0174]
Period ipiBySa cpiBy refBy M2By ernBy
6 [ 0.4912] [0] [0.0159] [0.0033] [0.0049]
24 [ 0.1841] [0.0104] [0.0113] [0.0044] [0.0023]
Source: own computations.
Table 4.5: Variance decomposition of prices
cpiRu
Period oil ipiRuSa cpiRu refRu M2Ru ernRu
6 [0.0211] [ 0.0620] [0.8669] [0.0045] [0.0360] [0.0095]
24 [0.0405] [ 0.1242] [0.5456] [0.0148] [0.2542] [0.0203]
cpiBy
Period oil ipiRuSa cpiRu refRu M2Ru ernRu
6 [0.0129] [ 0.0037] [0.0032] [0.0244] [0.0273] [0.0663]
24 [0.0101] [ 0.0121] [0.0160] [0.0660] [0.2663] [0.1700]
Period ipiBySa cpiBy refBy M2By ernBy
6 [ 0.0044] [0.8097] [0.0134] [0] [0.0339]
24 [ 0.0022] [0.4078] [0.0397] [0] [0.0094]
Source: own computations.
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tools for the stabilization of the economies.
Figure 4.8: Impulse responses to an output shock in Russia (1 st.dev
shock), units
Source: own computations.
In Russia, a shock to output peaks in 3 months and dies out in 1.5 years. The
exchange rate is the fastest to react. In response to a positive output shock, the
exchange rate appreciates, what may be interpreted as a consequence of higher
demand for the RUR due to intensifying export activities (in particular, export
of oil products). Then, an output shock is transmitted to the money supply and
the interest rate (with improving liquidity of the Russian banks). An output
shock positively affects the producers’ price level, while the consumer prices
(Figure 4.9) respond at the edge of significance: firstly, with a drop (that could
be due to the RUR appreciation) and, after 20 months, with a peak caused by
money supply growth and interest rate decrease.
Consumer price shocks in Russia die out after 20 months (Figure 4.9). Ac-
cording to our estimations, they result only in marginally significant feedback
of the exchange rate that reaches a trough 10 months after a positive price
fluctuation. Behavior of other variables (including the reference rate of the
CBR) is uncertain. Somewhat better results (weakly significant increase of the
interest rate in responce to a positive price shock) are obtained for a model with
the PPI and the interbank interest rate (Figure A.1). The generated impulse
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Figure 4.9: Impulse responses to a price shock in Russia (1 st.dev
shock), units
Source: own computations.
responses to output and price shocks in Russia, to some extent, challenge our
conclusions from the previous section: we do not find evidence of the counter-
cyclical behavior of the Russian monetary authorities (aimed on stabilization
of output and prices). Nonetheless, the structural shocks identified with a VAR
in levels may not correspond to the inflation and output gaps that presumably
enter the central bank’s response function. Moreover, the results are not robust
to different inflation measures and may be sensitive to the number of included
lags and possible asymmetries.
In Belarus (Figure 4.10), output shocks are less persistent and disappear
in 7 months. Pure Belarusian output fluctuations do not generate significant
impulse responses; the weight of output shocks in the variance decomposition
of other variables does not surpass 1% in the medium term.
A price shock (Figure 4.11), in contrast to Russia, is more persistent than
the output disturbance (reflecting difficulties the NBB faces with inflation); it
takes around 3 years for the price level to return to the equilibrium. The
shock induces reaction of only nominal variables. The BYR rapidly loses value
following a positive price shock. Dynamics of the interest rate points on the
attempt of the NBB to stabilize the prices.
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Figure 4.10: Impulse responses to an output shock in Belarus (1 st.dev
shock), units
Source: own computations.
Figure 4.11: Impulse responses to a price shock in Belarus (1 st.dev
shock), units
Source: own computations.
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Further, we analyze relative importance of foreign shocks. Positive fluctu-
ations of oil prices result in statistically significant feedback of both real and
nominal indicators for Russia, illustrating dependence of the Russian economy
on the oil industry. Variance decomposition of the forecast errors shows that
changes in the world oil prices in the medium term account for 10% of the
output variability and 20% of the producers’ prices deviations (however, they
explain only about 4% of the consumer prices variance).
For the Belarusian economy, changes in the oil prices have strong impact
only on the output indicator (the effect is mainly transmitted through the
changes in the Russian output). As to the variance decomposition, oil prices
fluctuations are responsible for about 13% of the Belarusian output variability,
which is comparable to the feedback of the Russian indicator.
Importance of the Russian shocks for the Belarusian economy is significant;
fluctuations of the Russian real and nominal variables explain up to 75% of the
variability of the Belarusian indicators. The Russian output shocks turn out
to be the major factor of the variability of the Belarusian economic activity by
explaining around 20% of its forecast error in both short and medium terms.
The Belarusian consumer price level variance is strongly affected by the change
of the Russian money supply and the nominal exchange rate of the RUR, which
contribute accordingly 26% and 17% to the CPI forecast error in the medium
run. In total, imported inflation from Russia can be roughly estimated at 53%
in a 2-year horizon. Since we did not account for any other world variable,
except for the oil prices, weight of the Russian economy is likely to be overes-
timated; from another side, it indicates that the external shocks affecting the
countries are often symmetric.
The CBR reference rate is responsible for 9% of the NBB reference rate
variability in the short run with its share increasing to 29% in 24 months. A
shock to the CBR policy rate is also found to cause significant deviations of the
NBB policy rate (Figure 4.12). Unlike domestic monetary policy shocks, a
fluctuation of the CBR reference rate results in statistically significant reaction
of the Belarusian output; the impulse is mainly transmitted via the change of
the Russian output.
Impulse responses of the Belarusian variables to the RUR nominal exchange
rate change show low degree of the countries’ exchange rates synchronization.
For instance, increase of the RUR value relative to the USD leads to decrease
of the effective nominal exchange rate index of the BYR, higher price level (as
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Figure 4.12: Impulse responses to the CBR reference rate shock in
Belarus (1 st.dev shock), units
Source: own computations.
the speed of price adjustment for imported goods is high), and consequently
higher reference rate of the NBB.
Inspection of the exchange rate variance decomposition shows further differ-
ences. Nominal exchange rate of the RUR is mostly determined by movements
of output and world oil prices that account accordingly for 30% and 16% of the
RUR nominal exchange rate forecast error variance in the medium term. The
BYR nominal effective exchange rate variance features the smallest (among
other Belarusian variables), but still considerable share of the Russian shocks:
around 20% in the short run and 50% in the medium term. Its major determi-
nant, though, is the Belarusian price level (65% in the short term). After 24
months, the weight of domestic prices remains at almost 40%. While in Russia,
the exchange rate serves as absorber of the real domestic and external demand
shocks, in Belarus, its variability is largely determined by unanchored inflation
expectations and historic mistrust to the BYR. Based on our analysis, we can-
not conclude that the Belarusian nominal exchange rate plays a significant role
as an adjustment tool to real fluctuations.
For s robustness check, we fitted a VAR model to the stationarized series:
the GDP gaps, seasonal differences for other variables. With the alternative
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Figure 4.13: Impulse responses to the RUR nominal exchange rate
shock in Belarus (1 st.dev shock), units
Source: own computations.
data we obtained similar results, but the model fit is inferior to the baseline
choice in terms of lower log-likelihood and information criteria and presence
of higher autocorrelation in the residuals. Similar results were also obtained
when alternative identifying restrictions were imposed. The matlab code and
additional output can be found in the Appendix.
Possible bias of the estimation results could be related to the time-variability
of the model parameters that is usually the case for transition economies. How-
ever, in this work, we restrain from dividing the data and conducting estimation
for subsamples separated by possible structural break(s): the characteristics
of the earlier and the later parts of the whole sample are different (the first
half of 2000s was characterized by gradual macroeconomic stabilization, while
major crises happened after 2008). The substantial change in the Belarusian
monetary policy took place after the currency crisis in 2011 (two years of ob-
servations would not be enough to draw any valid conclusions on the changes
in the monetary policy transmission). In Russia, the transformation of the
monetary policy (from the exchange rate to the inflation targeting) is expected
to be completed only by 2015. A potential improvement could be obtained
by employing a TVAR (time-varying VAR) specification that would allow for
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asymmetries under different regimes (i.e. based on a threshold value of a tran-
sition variables). In that case, it would be problematic to estimate a two-sector
VAR model to account for the effect of the Russian and the world shocks on the
Belarusian economy. Yet, the appropriate fit of a time-varying VAR model to
the Belarusian and Russian data could complement the findings of the present
work.
The conducted analysis has revealed a number of differences in the monetary
policy transmission between the countries. In Russia, the monetary policy
shocks (interest rate and money supply) affect both nominal and real variables.
As to the Belarusian data, we can conclude on the importance of the NBB
policy tools for the nominal variables; but their effect on the output is weak
(inconsistent). The Belarusian output responds marginally significantly only
to the change in the volumes of domestic credit to private sector. In contrast
to the Russian economy, the credit transmission channel in Belarus is more
operational relative to the interest rate channel.
A monetary policy shock in Russia is amplified through the change in the
money supply, while the nominal exchange rate channel contributes to the shock
only initially; its further behavior is mainly determined by output dynamics.
In Belarus, on the contrary, the exchange rate plays a significant role in the
transmission of the monetary policy shocks by reenforcing the effect of the
interest rate change, as perceptions of the BYR value are closely linked to the
inflation expectations and vice versa. Fundamental differences in the nominal
exchange rate determination should be noted. In Russia, the value of the RUR
is mainly determined by the output dynamics and the world oil prices. In
Belarus, the dynamics of the nominal exchange rate is strongly affected by
expectations, while contribution of real variables and oil prices is negligible.
Some of the aforementioned differences could be attributed to asymmet-
ric nominal shocks and higher inflation expectations that influence monetary
policy transmission in Belarus. This type of misalignment is not a serious
counterargument against the monetary union, as the nominal asymmetries are
expected to be reduced once the countries are subject to the single monetary
policy. Besides, the importance of the Russian shocks for the Belarusian econ-
omy is significant: the movements of the Russian variables explain from 50%
(the BYR nominal exchange rate) to 75% (the output) of the variance of the
Belarusian indicators in the medium term. The policy rate of CBR generates
significant responses of the Belarusian production (following the change of the
economic activity in Russia). At the same time, different interest rate pass-
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throughs indicate that the Belarusian financial market is less sensitive to the
cost of credit. That may be the consequence of high weight of the state sector
in the Belarusian economy and its reliance on the directed crediting. Privati-
zation reforms may be required prior to the monetary integration. In addition,
opposite reactions of the nominal exchange rates to shocks reflect differences in
the industry structures. For instance, oil-driven appreciation of the RUR (once
the single currency) may create unfavorable conditions for the Belarusian ex-
porters and, in the absence of alternative stabilization channels, can lead to
public indebtedness (and tensions within the union), thus increasing the costs
of the monetary integration for Belarus.
Chapter 5
Estimating Welfare Losses of
Alternative Monetary Policies
This chapter presents a NK DSGE model for the Belarusian economy. The set-
up allows evaluating welfare losses generated by different monetary policy rules.
The model employs some results of the two previous chapters for calibration of
the parameters (in particular, shocks correlations and monetary policy response
coefficients) and, within the scope of the thesis, it summarizes the analysis of
the possible costs of the monetary union for Belarus relative to the free-floating
exchange rate regime. For simplification reasons, the employed model features
several limiting assumptions, therefore, the results presented below should be
considered as preliminary. In a way, the main purpose of this chapter is setting
the basis for further research.
5.1 Introduction to the DSGE Modeling for a Small
Open Economy
New-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (NK DSGE) structures
allow modeling economic systems and their business cycles under the assump-
tion of incomplete markets, i.e. under imperfect competition and nominal
rigidities that render monetary policy non-neutral. Consequently, NK DSGE
setting has become a useful tool to evaluate different monetary policy rules.
One of the advantages of the NK DSGE over VAR models is the overcoming of
the Lucas critique. The critique targets monetary policy analysis by the means
of aggregate macroeconomic variables, as it is hard to impossible to differen-
tiate between the pure shock and the impact of the monetary policy. The
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NK DSGE models are built on structural fundamentals and, in this way, can
be more sophisticated. The model introduced below is based on the NK DSGE
setting outlined by Gali & Monacelli (2002). The proposed model is designed
for a small open economy with Calvo sticky prices; the economy is subject to
domestic and foreign shocks.
Equilibrium dynamics of the economy is characterized by a system of equa-
tions for domestic inflation (new Keynesian Phillips curve), output gap (dy-
namic IS-type equation), and monetary policy rule:
New-Keynesian Philips curve: the NK DSGE characterizes inflation as a function
of inflation expectations and output gap; the output gap in its turn can
be expressed in terms of average marginal costs in the economy.
Output gap: the forward-looking IS curve connects output gap to nominal and
natural interest rates.
Monetary rule: the rule describes how nominal interest rate is set by the mon-
etary authority.
The NK DSGE model for the Belarusian economy was elaborated by the ana-
lysts of the NBB in the mid-2000s (Demidenko 2008) to provide medium-term
forecasts. The NBB model’s set-up allows for two effective monetary policy in-
struments - the short-term interest rate and the nominal exchange rate. Among
exogenous variables affecting dynamics of the Belarusian economy, the model
comprises the Russian output gap, the RUR/USD nominal exchange rate, the
Russian CPI inflation, as well as the U.S. short-term interest rate and the U.S.
CPI change. Although Demidenko (2008) emphasizes the importance of the
developed model for communicating the objectives and actions of the NBB, no
further results of the application nor development have been published since
2008. The most recent attempt to apply the NK DSGE framework to the Belaru-
sian data was made by Zarecky (2012) , who also based his work on the model
proposed by Gali & Monacelli (2002). Zarecky limits the analysis to the eval-
uation of the NBB reaction functions and compares welfare losses under three
different sets of response coefficients to inflation and output gap. The major
contribution of the paper is, however, calibration of the parameters employed
in the model. Both Zarecky (2012) and Demidenko (2008) point out difficulties
in applying the DSGE framework to the Belarusian data. The minor problems
are related to data restrictions that complicate calibration of parameters. The
major issues are related to high inflation expectations in Belarus and a weak
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role of the interest rate as the policy transmission channel, what complicates
estimation of the models and their application for forecasting.
The model presented in this chapter analyses the welfare impacts under
three monetary policy rules: hypothetical inflation targeting regime (by the
independent central bank), proxy of the current monetary policy of the NBB,
and imported monetary policy of the CBR (in case of the monetary union with
Russia). The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 outlines the
model; Section 5.3 describes calibration of the parameters; Section 5.4 presents
the results.
5.2 Model Set-up
5.2.1 Assumptions and Some Identities
Before proceeding with the households’ and firms’ optimization problems, we
outline the assumptions and explain the most important identities. We set-
up a model for Belarus as a small open economy. Instead of some proxy for
the ’world’, Russia is considered as the only neighbor, given its high share
in the Belarusian trade and significant impact on the Belarusian economy as
confirmed by the results from the previous chapters. It is assumed that bilateral
trade turnover is negligible relative to the total consumption and production
of Russia. Although some information is lost due to such choice, the setting
corresponds to the objective of evaluating welfare costs of the possible monetary
union. We model an economy with staggered prices a la Calvo, but for the
time allow for flexible wages. Following Gali and Monacelli, we assume that
the law of one price holds (i.e. there is no price discrimination for local and
foreign consumers) and that the financial markets are complete. In addition,
we keep the perfect foresight assumption, therefore, in the steady state, terms
of trade are equal to 1, implying that in the equilibrium: PPP holds, domestic
inflation is equal to CPI inflation, exchange rate is determined exclusively by
the dynamics of the price level. Challenging the aforementioned assumptions
in alternative specification could be used for the model enhancement during
later research.
The main identities are specified below.
Composite consumption index: is a weighted sum of domestic- and foreign-produced
goods that is determined by the openness of the economy (α) and the
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substitutability between domestic and foreign goods (η).
Ct = [(1− α)1/η(CH,t)(η−1)/η + α1/η(CF,t)(η−1)/η]η/(η−1) (5.1)
Demand functions and composite price indexes: are obtained by minimizing costs
of consumption bundles and solving for optimal quantity of goods in terms
of their prices, total price level in the economy and total consumption.








where CH,t - demand for domestic-produced goods, CF,t - demand for
foreign goods, PH,t, PF,t - domestic and foreign price indices, Pt = [(1 −
α)1/η(PH,t)
(η−1)/η +α1/η(PF,t)
(η−1)/η]η/(η−1) - consumer price index (CPI).
In a special case when η is approaching 1, Pt = P
1−α
H,t ∗ PαF,t.
Terms of trade and inflation: represent price of foreign goods in terms of domes-
tic prices (ratio of import prices to export prices). Both PF,t and PH,t are




st = pf,t − ph,t (5.4)
By linearizing CPI equation around steady state (PH,t = PF,t = P̄ ) and
substituting with terms of trade:
pt = (1− α)ph,t + αpf,t = (1− α)ph,t + α(ph,t + st) = ph,t + αst (5.5)
Then, inflation in an open economy can be characterized as
πt = pt − pt−1 = πh,t + α M st (5.6)
Thus, inflation depends on readjustment of domestic prices, change in
terms of trade and openness of an economy.
Nominal exchange rate : assuming that the law of one price holds and that
there is only one global partner, we obtain
PF,t = εtP
∗
t , where P
∗
t is the composite world (partner’s) price index and
εt - bilateral exchange rate (local currency per unit of foreign currency)
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or in logs:
pf,t = et + p
∗
t (5.7)
Real effective exchange rate (RER) : RER is defined as nominal exchange rate
multiplied by the ratio of world price index to domestic CPI. In logs:
qt = et + p
∗
t − pt (5.8)
combining equations (5.4, 5.5, 5.7, 5.8) yields
qt = st + ph,t − pt = (1− α)st. (5.9)
Interest-rate sharing : assuming complete capital markets, discount rate (Qt,t+1)
in all the economies is the same. Thus, domestic consumption can be
derived as a function of world consumption index (C∗t ) and real effective
exchange rate. In logs:
ct = c
∗
t + 1/σqt = c
∗
t + 1/σ(1− α)st (5.10)
Uncovered interest parity : also arises from the assumption of complete markets
- foreign and domestic bonds should have the same discount rate (when
compared in one currency). In logs:
it − i∗t = Et[∆et+1] (5.11)
where it and i
∗
t stand for nominal interest rates.
5.2.2 Household’s problem







PtCt + Et[Qt,t+1Dt+1] ≤ Dt +WtNt + Tt
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where Ct represents composite consumption index (consists of domestic and
imported goods); Nt - hours worked; Pt - consumer price index (includes prices
of domestic as well as imported goods denominated in domestic currency); Dt
stands for bonds (any other pay-off received from investment made in previous
period); Qt,t+1 - discount rate; Et[Qt,t+1Dt+1] may be interpreted as present
value of expected pay-off in next period; Wt - nominal wage; Tt - lump-sum
taxes/transfers.







By setting up Langrangian and maximizing the function with respect to Ct, Nt













) = Qt,t+1 (5.13)
We can exactly log-linearize the above equations:
wt − pt = σct + ϕnt
ct = Et(ct+1)− 1/σ(it − Et(πt+1)− ρ)
where small-case variables denote logs of corresponding variables; ρ = −logβ,






Production function and marginal costs
We assume linear production function for each differentiated good j :
Yt(j) = AtNt(j), where at = log(At) (technology shock) - follows autoregres-
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mct = −ν + wt − ph,t − at (5.14)
where ν = −log(1− τ), τ -employment subsidy.


























and in a first-order linear approximation approaches zero. Thus, log-linearized
production function has a form of:
yt = at + nt (5.15)
Calvo price-setting
It is assumed that each period the fraction (1− θ) firms readjust their prices.
The price ¯PH,t is chosen such that the present value of future pay-offs is maxi-
mized. It is supposed, that once readjusted, the price will remain the same for




θkEt[Qt,t+kYt+k(j)( ¯PH,t −MCnt+k)] (5.16)
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By substituting forQt,t+k from Euler equation, dividing by PH,t−1, log-linearizing
around zero-inflation, and rearranging:
¯ph,t − ph,t−1 =
∞∑
0




where ˆmct+k is log-deviation of real marginal costs from steady state value:
µ = log(ε/(ε− 1)); where µ is a constant mark-up in a friction-less setting (no
market power of individual firms is assumed).
Domestic inflation (in logs) is equal to




Thus, domestic inflation is a function of real marginal costs and expected
change in domestic price level.
5.2.4 Equilibrium
From market clearing condition output of good j is equal to its consumption
at home and export abroad:
Yt(j) = CH,t(j) + C
∗























whereRERt - real exchange rate (in levels) between home country and its global
partner. Here, we assume C∗t = Y
∗
t . Second equality in (5.20) is derived from
the assumption of complete capital markets (5.10). Consequently, aggregate







t + α] (5.21)
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Equation (5.21) can be log-linearized around the steady-state (PPP condition
holds, RER = 1):
yt = y
∗
t + 1/σαst (5.22)
where σα =
σ
(1− α) + α ∗ (ση + (1− α)(ση − 1))
.
Combining equation (5.22) with the Euler equation one gets intertemporal
condition for output of home country:




= Et(yt+1)− 1/σα(it − Et(πh,t+1)− ρ) + αΘEt(y∗t+1) (5.23)
where ω = ση + (1− α)(ση − 1) and Θ = ω − 1.
Second, marginal costs are expressed as a function of the home country’s
output, global output and terms of trade.
Recalling equations (5.14) for marginal costs, and in addition (5.5), (5.12) and
(5.23):
mct = −ν+σy∗t +ϕyt+st−(1−ϕ)at = −ν+(σα+ϕ)yt+(σ−σα)y∗t −(1−ϕ)at
(5.24)
Hence, home inflation that depends on the real marginal costs can be eventually
expressed in terms of a country’s output, domestic productivity shock, and
global output (that in turn is subject to the global productivity shock).
5.2.5 Key equations
The key equations of the model are summarized below.
NKPC: output gap is defined as xt = yt − ȳt, where ȳt - equilibrium output
level, derived from (5.25) when mct = −µ:









, ψ = − Θσα
σα + ϕ
. Combining with (5.19)
yields:
πh,t = βEt[πh,t+1] + kαxt (5.26)
where kα = λ(σα + ϕ).
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IS curve: forward-looking curve is derived from (5.23)
xt = Et[xt+1]− 1/σα(it − Et(πh,t+1)− r̄rt) (5.27)
where r̄rt = ρ − σαΓ(1 − ρa)at + ασα(Θ + ψ)Et∆y∗t+1 - natural interest
rate of a small open economy.
In contrast to the closed economy, the small open economy is influenced by the
degree of its openness (α): it affects the sensitivity of the output gap to the
interest changes and links the natural interest rate to expected foreign output
growth.
5.2.6 Optimal Monetary Policy and Welfare Loss Function
Recalling the closed economy New-Keynesian framework, Gali & Monacelli
(2002) state that the optimal monetary policy for a small open economy is also
the one that replicates the flexible price equilibrium allocation. In a small open
economy there are two main sources of distortion that combined with price-
stickiness render monetary policy non-neutral: 1) market power of firms and
2) incentive to influence terms of trade in a beneficial way to a home economy.
The latter results from the imperfect substitutability between domestic and
foreign goods. These distortions can be eliminated by introducing employment
subsidy (τ) that enters real marginal costs and keeps them at their steady
state level (−µ). It can be shown that for a special case, when σ = η = γ = 1,
τ should be set such that (1 − τ)(1 − α) = 1 − 1
ε
. By stabilizing mark-ups
in this way, nominal rigidities are no longer binding, since firms do not have
any incentive to adjust prices, while the monetary authority does not have
any desire to improve the terms of trade. Flexible price equilibrium allocation
implies stabilization of output gap (xt = 0 for all t) and domestic price level
(πh,t = 0 for all t). Consequently, nominal interest rate (it) under optimal
policy is equal to the natural interest rate, i.e. it changes only in response to
the real domestic and foreign productivity shocks. Gali and Monacelli show
that under particular assumptions σ = η = γ = 1, the policy of strict domestic
inflation targeting corresponds to the optimal policy (the one stabilizing the
output gap). Alternative policy rules can be evaluated in terms of the implied
welfare losses.
Welfare loss function is derived as a second order approximation to the
utility losses of a representative household. Gali and Monacelli represent it in
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terms of the variance of domestic inflation and the output gap:
L = −1− α
2
∗ (ε/λ ∗ var(πh,t) + (1 + ϕ) ∗ var(xt)) (5.28)
5.2.7 Monetary Policy Rules
The model analyses the following rules:
CPI inflation targeting models the Belarusian economy with hypothetical inde-
pendent central bank that directly reacts only to price changes; we con-
sider the CPI inflation as the target, since, currently, the NBB formulates
its goal by referring to that indicator. Moreover, the available statisti-
cal data does not differentiate between the domestic and the imported
inflation, thus, complicating calibration of the parameters:
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ)(φππt). (5.29)
CPI inflation and output targeting approximates current monetary policy of the
NBB, which may be subject to the inflationary bias:
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ)(φππt + φxxt). (5.30)
Exchange rate targeting forecasts dynamics of the Belarusian economy in case
of possible monetary union with Russia:
et = 0. (5.31)
As can be seen, we also allow for persistence of the policy rules, assuming some
willingness of the monetary authorities to limit fluctuations of the nominal
interest rates. As it cannot be assumed that Russia has achieved zero inflation,
we add equations describing inflation in Russia, evolution of the Russian real
marginal costs, and the policy rule of the CBR reacting to both inflation and
the productivity shock. Appendix B contains the full set of equations used in
the model.
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5.3 Calibration of parameters
The focus of the present work is to compare welfare losses for the Belarusian
economy that may result, in particular, due to misalignment of the business
cycles with the potential anchor - Russia. Therefore, we concentrate on the
calibration of the parameters related to the shocks characteristics and to the
policy functions of the monetary authorities. As to the other parameters, for
the time being, we make simplified assumptions that could be challenged and
reviewed during later works on this topic.
Following Gali & Monacelli (2002), we set σ = 1 for both countries. Thus,
we assume that the households are risk-neutral and the utility function has log-
arithmic form (Zarecky calibrated σ using the Belarusian data on consumption
and real wages and obtained the parameter equal to 1.16). Parameter φ can be
proxied as wage elasticity of labor supply. Given low variability of the officially
registered unemployment in Belarus (see Chapter 2, we set φ equal to 3, which
implies low elasticity of labor. We also suppose perfect substitutability of the
domestic and foreign goods by fixing η = 1. As to the elasticity of substitution
between goods produced within one country (ε), following other researchers, we
fix it equal to 6 (consequently, mark-up constitutes 18.23%) for both economies.
Discount factor β is estimated as (1/(1 + r)), where r - the natural interest
rate, which is proxied by the average real interest rate on new deposits in the
national currency in 2000:Q1 - 2010:Q2 (excluding the period of the currency
crisis for Belarus). We obtain β = 0.98 (r = 5.5% annualized ≈ 1.03% to be
used in the model, where one period is equivalent to one quarter) for Belarus
and β = 0.99 (r = 3.5% annualized) for Russia. Price stickiness θ is set as in
Zarecky (2012) at 0.55 for Belarus. The author motivates the choice by fast
pass-through of the exchange rate fluctuations and high inflation expectations
to prices. At the same time, goods and serves, subject to regulated pricing,
constitute about 20% of the CPI basket (Zarecky 2012); thus, for a sensitivity
check, we will also use a higher θ. For Russia, the price rigidity indicator is
made equal to 0.75 (similar to studies of other countries). Openness α is esti-
mated as imports from Russia over GDP (average for the last three years: 2009
- 2012) - 0.55.
Shock persistence coefficients are calibrated by fitting AR(1) process to the
seasonally adjusted HP-filtered time-series of quarterly log GDP of Belarus
and Russia (quite strong assumption that the output shock is only due to
the productivity shock). By estimating data from 2000-2012 we obtain the
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following coefficients of shock persistence:
Belarus: 0.760; Russia: 0.862; shock correlation: 0.806 / 0.506
We use two alternative values for shock correlation: the first corresponds to
shock synchronization in the period 2005-2009:Q4, which was characterized by
the highest alignment of the economies (Section 3.1), shocks are proxied with
the GDP-gap; the second corresponds to the correlation of supply shocks recov-
ered using the Blanchard and Quah procedure (Section 3.2). From theoretical
point of view, such shocks, when distinguished from temporary disturbances,
may better proxy unobserved productivity fluctuations.
Response coefficients for the policy rules targeting both inflation and output
gap are calibrated based on the analysis performed in Subsection 4.2.2. In this
way, we set substantial persistence coefficients for the policy rates and assign
a stronger reaction to inflation for the CBR relative to the NBB.
5.4 Discussion of results
In order to evaluate relative performance of different monetary policy regimes,
we simulate domestic and global productivity shocks and investigate the behav-
ior of major variables under alternative policy rules. Following our discussion
on the optimal monetary policy in a small open economy, we set πh,t = 0 as
a benchmark regime that replicates flexible price equilibrium allocation and
results in zero welfare loss. Three other rules are evaluated relative to the
benchmark regime; the criteria are variance of output and domestic inflation.
Impulse responses to a domestic shock are presented in Figure 5.1. Here, shock
correlation is set to 0.5 and price stickiness coefficient for Belarus to 0.55.
Behavior of the variables under stronger shock correlation is similar, but, as
expected, is less volatile (see the electronic supplement, ch5/output).
Welfare losses in terms of the output and domestic inflation volatility for
four regimes are presented in the Table 5.1 to complement the analysis. We
consider losses generated under different correlation coefficients of domestic and
foreign productivity shocks. Besides, we investigate how the estimates change
depending on the price stickiness coefficient.
A positive domestic productivity (≈ aggregate supply) shock increases nat-
ural output level. In case the nominal interest rate is equal to the natural
interest rate (which reacts negatively to the shock in order to support transi-
tory increase of output and consumption), actual output becomes equal to its
natural level, and neither output gap, nor domestic inflation from price read-
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Figure 5.1: Impulse responses to a domestic productivity shock,%
Source: own computations.
OPT - πh,t = 0, CIT - CPI inflation targeting, Current - proxy of the current NBB rule, ER
- et = 0
Table 5.1: Welfare losses of alternative monetary policy regimes
Parameters’ values OPT CIT Current ER
shocks correlation = 0.80
θ = 0.50 0 -0.0847 -0.2177 -0.1362
θ = 0.75 0 -0.1525 -1.1985 -0.2270
shocks correlation = 0.50
θ = 0.50 0 -0.0796 -0.1863 -0.1413
θ = 0.75 0 -0.1439 -1.0125 -0.2409
Source: own calculations.
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justment occurs. Otherwise, if the monetary policy fails to accommodate the
shock, it will result in the deviations of the variables from their natural levels
and consequent welfare losses.
For the optimal rule, output and inflation gap, by construction, are set to
zero. Their stabilization is achieved by high variability of nominal interest rate,
which, given stable interest rate in Russia (in the absence of a shock), leads to
depreciation of the exchange rate and increase in the terms of trade. Owing to
high calibrated openness parameter, CPI index increases significantly with the
growth of the foreign price index.
Under the CPI targeting regime, we assume that a hypothetically indepen-
dent central bank sets the nominal interest rate to stabilize the CPI inflation.
Such regime may proxy inflation targeting with managed floating of the ex-
change rate. A positive domestic productivity shock requires real depreciation,
leading to increase in the CPI. In order to limit such fluctuation, monetary au-
thorities need to achieve smaller increase of the terms of trade. Thus, initially,
we observe more contractionary monetary policy (higher nominal interest rate)
compared to what is needed to ensure immediate shock transition. This re-
sults in negative output gap and decrease in domestic prices (to the extent of
price stickiness). Then, the more rigid domestic prices are, the longer shock
accommodation will last. For example, when the price stickiness coefficient is
set to 0.75, it takes 3 quarters more for output to reach its natural level, and
the welfare losses associated with the CPI targeting increase.
Exchange rate targeting regime assumes import of the Russian monetary
policy. In the absence of productivity shock in Russia, nominal interest and
exchange rates remain constant and cannot facilitate transition of an idiosyn-
cratic shock in Belarus. Consequently, a shock can be accommodated in the
economy only through decrease in domestic prices, which, to some extent, man-
age to increase the terms of trade and contribute to elimination of a negative
output gap. Thus, price rigidity becomes an important issue. The losses gener-
ated under θ = 0.55 (i.e. prices are readjusted every 2 quarters) are lower than
those occurring with more staggered pricing (θ = 0.75 presumes that prices are
fixed for one year). Another important factor is shock correlation: the losses
slightly decrease, when common incidence of productivity shocks in Belarus
and Russia is set at a higher level. Based on our results, though, increase in
price flexibility seems to be more important for reducing losses from fixing the
exchange rate. In terms of welfare costs, exchange rate targeting regime is infe-
rior to the CPI targeting. Notwithstanding, difference in performance of the two
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regimes becomes smaller when shock correlation and price flexibility increase.
In addition, if openness of Belarus increased, the weight of the Russian prices
in the CPI would grow and the inflation-targeting regime would approach the
fixed exchange rate arrangement. Meanwhile, both CPI and the exchange rate
targeting outperform a proxy of the current NBB monetary policy, for which we
assumed less strict response to inflation fluctuations (as compared to the CIT
and the CBR responses) and possibility of inconsistent reaction to the output
gap.
The latter observation opens an interesting discussion. Both regimes (infla-
tion targeting and monetary union) will become feasible, once the Belarusian
economy undergoes important transformations. Hence, the question on the
optimal monetary policy stated in the beginning of the thesis could be sub-
stituted by the one asking, which regime is faster and more realistically to
achieve. Based on the above NK DSGE results, price flexibility is a significant
factor of successful CPI inflation targeting, and due to presence of regulated
prices, it is hard to affirm that Belarus has achieved high flexibility. Limita-
tions of the model did not allow us to make further conclusions. But, according
to the findings in the previous chapters, unanchored inflation expectations and
low operationability of conventional monetary transmission channels seem to
be major obstacles for independent monetary policy of the NBB. Thus, the
necessary steps towards efficient inflation targeting are establishing credibility
and independence of the NBB together with removing rigidities in the economy,
many of which are related to strong presence of the state sector, overregulated
and still underliberalized markets. As to the possible monetary union, the
NK DSGE demonstrated importance of price flexibility and shock correlation.
If Belarus aimed on the monetary integration with Russia, some additional
structural alignment would be desired in order to increase shock synchroniza-
tion. This could be done, for instance, by intensifying ownership links and
intra-industry trade. Relaxing other rigidities that were not explored within
the scope of this work (notably, staggered wages and financial frictions) and
aligning monetary transmission mechanisms could be equally relevant. There-
fore, some important transformations (mostly related to increasing flexibility
of the Belarusian economy) are needed for successful implementation of both
regimes. Based on current trends, it might seem more feasible for Belarus to
become deeper integrated with Russia than to anchor inflation expectations
and establish trust to the BYR. Not to overestimate perspectives of the mone-
tary union, however, one has to keep in mind other costs that were absent from
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our analysis: possible political pressure, social tensions, as well as vulnerable
credibility of the CBR itself.
The above results, in a way, summarize possible costs of monetary union for
the Belarusian economy. Still, the employed model features many simplifying
assumptions and can provide only rough estimation of welfare costs. Elabora-
tion and estimation of a more sophisticated model that would better account
for the countries’ specific features requires a separate study and is beyond the
scope of the present thesis. Possible extensions of the work may include: adding
inflation expectations in Belarus (departing from the assumption of fully ra-
tional expectations and modeling deterministic shocks); accounting for other
rigidities (wage stickiness and financial frictions); introducing a third sector
(the rest of the world) and accounting for foreign shocks in Russia; having
explicit fiscal authority due to the large presence of the state sector in Belarus.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In the thesis, we applied the OCA framework to evaluate feasibility of the
possible monetary union between Belarus and Russia. Within the scope of the
present work, we concentrated on the alignment analysis of the two economies
in order to infer on some potential costs of such arrangement for Belarus.
Our first proposition was that despite long-dated history of integration,
there is significant cyclical and structural misalignment between the countries
due to asymmetry of shocks and different specializations of the economies. Dy-
namic correlation analysis of the economic activity indicators revealed that the
countries’ cyclical alignment peaked in 2005-2009 (average correlation of the
output growth rates amounted to 80%), but the symmetry has decreased since
the end of 2009, mostly due to different recovery paths undertaken after the
2008-2009 crisis. By the means of a structural VAR with long-run restrictions
we showed that temporary (demand) shocks were not symmetric, except for the
recession in 2008-2009, while the correlation of the permanent (supply) shocks
constituted about 50% in 2000-2009 and has also declined since 2010. Struc-
tural similarity of the economies was evaluated qualitatively using Landesmann
and Grubel-Lloyd indices. Sound manufacturing and agricultural sectors distin-
guish the Belarusian economy from the Russian. Relatively low intra-industry
trade share (30%) and prevalence of vertical trade likewise point on differences
in the economies’ structures and specializations. Ownership links with Russia
(characterized by the FDI stocks and inflows) are strong compared to the rest
of the world, but their weight relative to the Belarusian GDP is low, and, for
the time, they hardly contribute significantly to the cyclical alignment of the
economies. We conclude that the countries are, in general, subject to common
external and permanent fluctuations; the effects and transmission of shocks in
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the economies as well as responses to them, meanwhile, are not uniform. The
potential costs of the monetary union for Belarus may be high mostly due to
the structural misalignment. Intensification of the ownership links and increase
in the intra-industry trade prior to the monetary integration could reduce the
losses from the fixed exchange rate arrangement.
The second hypothesis questioned the congruency between the monetary
policy responses to shocks in Belarus and Russia and their transmission mech-
anisms. We calculated and compared the implied policy rates and estimated
policy response functions (Taylor rules) additionally allowing for asymmetric
reactions of the central banks during recessions and expansions. We com-
plemented the analysis with the estimation of a monetary VAR model. The
obtained results are not uniform in relation to the costs of the monetary union.
From the factors that speak for the monetary integration, we shall mention
high cyclical alignment in 2005-2010, as demonstrated by the implied Taylor
rules; more aggressive monetary policy of the CBR; mainly nominal impact of
the NBB monetary policy; importance of the Russian shocks for the Belaru-
sian economy. From another side, the conducted analysis revealed a number of
factors that could generate high costs of fixing the exchange rate. The mon-
etary policy transmission channels in Belarus and Russia are operational to
different extents. Distinct interest rate pass-throughs to output indicate that
the Belarusian economy is less sensitive to the cost of credit, what can be a
consequence of high weight of the state sector in the Belarusian economy and
its reliance on directed crediting. Reported differences in the countries’ ex-
change rates fundamentals supported our previous conclusion on the structural
misalignment between the economies.
In order to quantitatively summarize our findings, we estimated welfare
losses for the Belarusian economy that could be associated with the possible
monetary union relative to the alternative policy regimes (the inflation target-
ing and the current monetary policy rule). For this purpose, we set up a simple
NK DSGE model for Belarus as a small open economy, where we employed some
results of the preceding analysis for calibration of parameters (in particular,
shocks correlations and monetary policy response coefficients). According to
the obtained results, the fixed exchange rate arrangement outperformes the
proxy of the currently applied monetary policy of the NBB, while being infe-
riour to the CPI inflation targeting (conducted by hypothetically independent
central bank). We also showed that difference between the two latter regimes
becomes smaller when price flexibility and shocks correlation increase.
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The main contribution of the present thesis was in its attempt to evaluate
the alignment of the Belarusian and Russian economies and, consequently, to
identify some costs of the possible monetary union. Extensions of this work may
involve accounting for the time variability and asymmetries of the key equations
used to describe the economies, as well as setting up more sophisticated NK
DSGE model that would better capture specific features of the Belarusian and
Russian economies and provide more precise estimations of the costs associated
with the monetary union. It should be also noted that within the scope of this
thesis, we concentrated only on possible economic costs that may arise as a
result of abandoning own monetary policy. Analysis of other costs, including
those of social and political nature, could equally become subject of further
research.
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Appendix A
Additional output from empirical
estimations
Figure A.1: Impulse responses to an interbank rate and PPI shock in
Russia (1 st.dev shock), units
Source: own computations.
Figure A.2: Variance decomposition of the BYR and RUR nominal ex-
change rates (baseline model)
Source: own computations.
A. Additional output from empirical estimations II
Table A.1: Model Checking. Baseline Monetary VAR
Cointegration Test Causality Tests 
Johansen test 
 
Number of equations = 11 
Lag order = 2 
Estimation period: 2000:05 - 2012:12 (T = 152) 
Case 5: Unrestricted trend and constant 
 
Log-likelihood = 4516.33 (including constant term: 
4084.97) 
Rank Eigenvalue Trace test  p-value  Lmax test  p-
value 
   0    0.65242     547.62 [0.0000]     160.63 [0.0000] 
   1    0.50916     386.99 [0.0000]     108.17 [0.0000] 
   2    0.39409     278.83 [0.0000]     76.156 [0.0005] 
   3    0.32458     202.67 [0.0006]     59.649 [0.0151] 
   4    0.21847     143.02 [0.0282]     37.468 [0.5090] 
   5    0.19364     105.55 [0.0633]     32.714 [0.4538] 
   6    0.12560     72.837 [0.1390]     20.401 [0.8743] 








joint 0.000 0.0567 
ipiBy_dseas 0.000 0.8573 
cpiBy_dseas 0.3206 0.6558 
refBy 0.1049 0.1408 
m2By_dseas 0.1852 0.003 
ernBy_dseas 0.1497 0.0153 
 
Granger causality 
H0: variable does not Granger-cause "oil_dseas, 




H0: Covariance between the error vectors is equal to 
zero. 
Stability Test 
modulus of the eigenvalues of the inverse characteristic polynomial: 
|z| = ( 27.9439    4.5885     4.5885     7.0706     7.0706     1.7971     1.7971     1.1167     1.1167     2.0158     2.0158     






Equations of the DSGE Model
To set up the model we used equations log-linearized around their steady states.
Endogenous variables: πh,t - domestic inflation, xt - output gap, rt - domes-
tic nominal interest rate, rnatt - natural interest rate, at - domestic productiv-
ity, yt - domestic output, ȳt - domestic natural output, st - effective terms of
trade between the country and the world, πt - CPI inflation, qt - real exchange
rate, et - nominal exchange rate, ph,t and pt domestic price level and CPI price
level, ct - consumption, nxt - trade balance, πglob,t - global inflation (here and
further, glob corresponds to the Russian variables as it is the only foreign part-
ner in the model), yglob,t - global output, aglob,t - global productivity, rglob,t -
global interest rate. Variables at, aglob,t, rt, rglob,t, st, et are treated as state
(i.e. predetermined) variables. “Natural” denotes behaviour of variables in the
frictionless (flexible price) setting.
First, we introduce equations that describe different home monetary policy
rules - one of the following rules can be chosen to run the code.
1. πh,t = 0 - benchmark rule corresponding to the optimal policy; denotes
strict inflation targeting that implies stable price level of domestic goods, no
inflationary bias of the Central Bank and, thus, no output gap.
2. rt = ρr ∗ rt−1 + φπ ∗ πt - CPI inflation targeting.
3. rt = ρr ∗ rt−1 +φπ ∗πt +φx ∗xt - Taylor rule; the central bank reacts to both
inflation and output gaps.
4. et = 0 - exchange rate targeting.
Russia is modeled as the closed economy. Thus, the policy rule is repre-
sented as:
5.rglob = ρrglob ∗ rglobt−1 + (1 − ρrglob) ∗ (φπglob ∗ πglobt + φgapglob ∗ aglobt).
Thus, we also allow for some persistence of the policy rate. Here, φgapglob =
B. Equations of the DSGE Model IV
−σ ∗ (1 + ϕ) ∗ (1− ρaglob)
ϕ+ σ
.
Home and global productivity are subject to random shocks:
6. at = ρa ∗ at−1 + shocka + correla,aglob ∗ shockaglob;
7. aglob,t = ρaglob ∗ aglobt−1 + shockaglob.
where shocka, shockaglob ∼ N(0, σ2a).
Further, we refer to the equations containing other variables of home and
global economies.
8. πh,t = β ∗ πh,t+1 + κ ∗ xt - Philips curve.
9. xt = xt+1 − 1/σα ∗ (rt − πh,t+1 − rnatt) - IS curve.
10. rnatt = ρ − σα ∗ Γ ∗ (1 − ρa) ∗ at + α ∗ σα ∗ (Θ + ψ) ∗ (yglob,t+1 − yglob,t) -
natural interest rate. Note that in the code ρ is set to 0, since we use equations
that are log-linearized around the steady state (deviation of a constant from
the steady state = 0). For the same reason, constant ρ is also dropped in the
monetary policy rules.
11. yt = xt + ȳt - characterizes output gap as a deviation of actual output from
its natural (flexible-price) state. Deviation is a result of market frictions.
12. ȳt = Ω + Γ ∗ at + α ∗ ψ ∗ yglob,t - natural output that depends on the
productivity shock and global output that in its turn is a function of global
productivity shock. !Note that in the code Ω is set to zero. It is assumed that
the fiscal authority acts optimally, thus, employment subsidy is set such as to
eliminate the market frictions (µ = τ); therefore Ω = 0.
13. πt = πh,t + α ∗ (st − st−1) - represents CPI inflation and also characterizes
intertemporal terms of trade.
14. st−st−1 = et−et−1+πglob,t−πh,t - represents dynamics of nominal exchange
rate.
15. yt = yglob,t + 1/σα ∗ st - international risk sharing condition.
16. yt = at + nt - production function.
17. ct = yglob,t + (1− α)/σ ∗ st - market clearing condition.
18. nxt = α ∗ (ω/σ − 1) ∗ st - trade balance.
19. qt = (1− α) ∗ st - real exchange rate.
20. ph,t = πh,t + ph,t−1 - domestic price level.
21. pt = πt + pt−1 - CPI price level.
22. πglob,t = βglob ∗ πglob,t+1 + λglob ∗mcglob,t; - inflation in Russia.
23. mcglob = (σ + φ) ∗ yglob,t − (1 + φ) ∗ aglob,t; - real marginal costs in Russia.
24. yglob = yglob,t+1 − (rglob − πglob,t+1)/σ; - output equation for Russia.
Appendix C
Content of Electronic Supplement
There is an electronic supplement to this thesis, which contains additional
output, empirical data, and MatLab and Gretl source codes.
 ch3: quarterly dataset; MatLab code for calculations performed in Chap-
ter 3 (including estimation of a SVAR with long-run restrictons).
 ch4: monthly dataset; Gretl code for estimation of monetary rules; Mat-
Lab code for estimation of monetary VAR; MatLab outputs for four al-
ternative VAR specifications.
 ch5: example of a dynare code; output figures with impulse responses to
domestic and foreign productivity shocks under different sets of parame-
ters (1. high price flexibility (0.55) and high shock correlation (0.80) and
2. low price flexibility (0.75) and low shock correlation (0.50)).
